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 The American public relies on the mass media to keep them apprised of important 
events and developments at home and abroad.  Often, media stories are the only source of 
information the public has on a subject, and thus are the basis of opinions and views on 
issues and world events.  Through story selection and reporting practices the media has 
great influence over public opinion, which in turn drives government policy in some 
areas.   
 This thesis will explore the effects of media influence on government decision 
making through changes in public opinion using the US intervention in Somalia as a case 
study.  A review of newspaper articles and opinion polls covering the life of the mission 
will provide the data for analysis of this phenomenon. 
 It is vital that the military understand how media methods drive public opinion so 
that these methods can be used to a strategic advantage so that the US national policy is 
not adversely affected by isolated trigger incidents, such as the Blackhawk Down 
incident of 03 October 1993.  The impact of such events can be minimized by using these 
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A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the effects of media influence on United 
States (US) foreign policy.  Particularly, how the perceived level of US military 
involvement in Somalia differed from the actual level of involvement and how a trigger 
incident1 such as the downing of a US Army Blackhawk helicopter in October of 1993 
affected decisions leading to the withdrawal of US forces from that country.  
  
B. AREA OF RESEARCH 
After the downing of US Army Blackhawk helicopters in Somalia on 03 October 
1993 there was a radical shift in US policy resulting in the withdrawal of military forces 
from the region.  The primary focus of this research is to describe the influence on 
government and military decision making that the media has due to its ability to affect 
public opinion.  Operation Restore Hope was the US portion of the United Nations (UN) 
intervention in Somalia and lasted from December 1992 until May 1993.  This operation 
and events occurring up until the final US withdrawal in March 1994 will serve as a case 
study to show that a conflict between public perception of national policies and actual 
policies can have catastrophic implications for these intended policies.  The improper 
preparation of public opinion by US policy makers through the media renders national 
policies vulnerable to attack through intentional or inadvertent trigger events.  The 
unexpected loss of life during the Blackhawk Down incident served as a trigger to a 





1 A trigger incident is a significant occurrence that sets off a chain of events.  An example would be 
the sinking of the Lusitania in 1917 propelling the United States into World War I against Germany; there 
were other influences on the US to join the Allies, but this event acted as the trigger.  Likewise, momentum 
had been building for a change in US policy in Somalia during the summer of 1993, and the incident on 03 
October was the final push that triggered that change and heralded the US withdrawal. 
1 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
How are government actions driven by public opinion resulting from media 
influences? 
 
2. Subsidiary Research Questions 
a) How do the media shape public opinion? 
b) What is the timeline of US involvement in Somalia, in terms of both policies 
put forth and actions taken? 
c) How do the media stories from the involvement period describe US actions? 
d) How does public opinion of the operation change with time following the 
media coverage of specific events? 
e) How do changes in government policy track with changes in public opinion? 
f) How could the public have been better prepared for the turn in events? 
 
D. SCOPE OF THESIS 
This thesis is applicable to military and government decision makers as a learning 
tool to help them understand the scope of media influences on public opinion.  As public 
opinion is an important driving force in determining the direction and effectiveness of US 
policies, it is vital that decision makers at all levels are aware of how public perceptions 
are shaped by the media.  It may be possible for decision makers to extract from this 
research a strategy for using the media to drive public opinion in a direction that is 
advantageous to national interests.  The focus of discussion centers on how public 
opinion determined US policies in response to the Blackhawk Down incident that 






To provide a basis for understanding the effects that the media has on public 
opinion, this paper first presents a discussion on media operations and how news is 
perceived and evaluated  by viewers and readers.  This information embodies the basis 
for analyzing the Somalia case, and is acquired through a literature review of studies on 
both media and influence.  An examination of historical documents and text sets the 
timeline for US involvement in-country and defines temporal boundaries for a data search 
on corresponding news articles and opinion polls.  The resulting collection of articles and 
polls is then set against the historical timeline and analyzed for trends and cause-and-
effect relationships to demonstrate how the media influence US policy through 
manipulation of public opinion. 
 
F. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II provides background material to give the reader a basic understanding 
of how the media influence public opinion, including story choice and presentation 
methods for both television and print media, and the methods by which the public 
chooses and processes the news to which they are exposed.  This chapter also describes 
the effects of media coverage in war and humanitarian situations, which are applicable to 
the case being studied here.  Chapter III introduces the case study and provides historical 
information on the situation in Somalia and an outline of the policies and actions leading 
up to and resulting from the Blackhawk Down incident.  Chapter IV presents a series of 
news articles and opinion polls following the timeline of US involvement in Somalia as 
set out in Chapter III.  Chapter IV continues with an analysis of the three data sets 
(timeline of actions, articles, and opinion polls) to determine the characteristics of any 
relationship that may exist between them.  Chapter V summarizes the conclusions and 
recommends a strategy for proper handling of the media by government and military 





G. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
The US government as a whole must be aware of the power of the media to form 
public opinion.  Particularly, it is vital that the military understand how media methods 
drive public opinion so that these methods can be used to a strategic advantage so that US 
national policy is not adversely affected by isolated trigger events.  This study will 
heighten awareness of this phenomenon and hopefully reduce the risk of undesired 




II. MEDIA INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The premise of this paper is that government policies are shaped by public 
opinion, which is influenced by the actions of the mass media.  In a democracy, policy is 
supposed to be determined by the people, the downside to this in American society is that 
public perceptions are based on the information they receive from the media, which 
biased and incomplete. As a first step in the research, we must first explore the nature of 
this influence.  Specifically, how the media affects public opinion and what mechanisms 
it uses to achieve this result.  The first three sections of this chapter provide background 
material to help the reader understand how the media operates, how readers and viewers 
receive and process the news, and how the media influences its audience.  The final 
section of this chapter describes the effects of media coverage on both public opinion and 
decision-makers in war and humanitarian situations.  Analyses presented in subsequent 
chapters are based on the information presented here. 
 
B. MASS MEDIA OPERATIONS 
Due to the structuring of the US media system, the mechanisms by which it works 
and the growth of concentrated ownership groups, the range of discourse allowed free 
reign is becoming narrower.  It is commonplace for the government line to be repeated 
without comment, analysis or opposing viewpoints being presented.  The trustworthiness 
of the source namely the anchor, the network, or the publisher causes the audience to 
accept the story in its given format without questioning the motives that may have been 
behind its slant.  There is also the fact that the majority of the public only exposes 
themselves to a limited number of news sources (usually one newspaper and one evening 
news broadcast), which narrows even further the scope of information they will be 
exposed to and then later have access to when forming their own views of an issue.  
Beyond that, there are certain characteristics of the news media that further guide the 




A news organization’s internal structure combines with market forces to affect 
when it can lead public opinion.  “Certain media outlets—especially newspapers and 
magazines, but sometimes also television’s programs ad networks—do not merely reflect 
the social and political forces around them, they actively work to shape political 
discourse to their own purposes.2”  News organizations play a major role in 
disseminating information to the public and because of this, leave an imprint on public 
opinion.  The media elites who determine the content of the news thus have a chance at 
leading the public and shaping political thought.  They make their decisions on which 
stories will come to press and make the telecast based on many factors such as politics, 
space and time concerns, and shock value.  Market considerations drive some news 
selection, especially when the news organization depends on advertising revenues, or 
high ratings in the case of television.  Economic concerns and competition with other 
news sources might induce organizations to anticipate what the public wants to know 
about in order to attract a larger audience, leading to story selection for the wrong 
reasons.  News is about selling the most papers or having the highest ratings rather than 
getting the news out to the public and informing them of current events—entertainment 
rather than education.   
The decisions on which stories to publish and air are made by individuals at 
different levels within the organizational structure of each media operation, namely 
reporters, editors, and owners.  Members of each group have their own set of incentives 
based on their position within the organization that help them decide which items are 
newsworthy.  In this way, the structure of the organization helps to facilitate collective 
action in getting a story chosen.  For example, if a reporter wants their story featured on 
the front page or at the tope of a news broadcast, they will frame the story in such a way 
that it is more likely to be chosen by their superiors.  Publishing decisions are also 
influenced by deadlines; if a story is not finished by press time it will not make the paper.  
Strict deadlines can have an effect on story content and quality as journalists rush to turn 
in a finished product. 
                                                 
2 Page, Benjamin I. Who Deliberates?: Mass Media in Modern Democracy.  Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1996. 
6 
2. Selecting Stories for Coverage 
People with money and power are able to filter the news, marginalize dissent, and 
allow the government and dominant private interests to get their message across to the 
public.  Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman summarize the forces behind this filtering 
as follows:3 
• Size, concentrated ownership, owner wealth, and profit orientation of the 
dominant mass media firms 
• Advertising as the primary income source of the mass media 
• Reliance of the media on information provided by government, business and 
experts funded and approved by these primary sources and agents of power 
• “Flak” as a means of disciplining the media 
• “Anti-communism” as a national religion and control mechanism 
 
On the subject of advertising, especially in television, there are also pressures to 
show a continual series of programs that will encourage audience flow (watching from 
program to program to sustain advertising rates and revenues.)  This results from 
advertisers wanting, in general, to avoid programs with serious complexities and 
disturbing controversies that may interfere with the buying mood of the consumer.  As a 
programming trend setter, the advertising dollar is responsible for cutbacks in hard-line, 
objective news reporting, informational, and documentary type programs. 
Since sources such as the US government and businesses are often well known, 
they are deemed reputable and therefore their veracity is not often questioned.  When a 
source is a governmental organization or individual from foreign country, such as 
Saddam Hussein, the media often frames their positions and comments as propaganda, 
suggesting that they are untrue.  “The elite domination of the media and the 
marginalization of dissidents that results from the operation of these filters occur so 
naturally that media news people, frequently operating with complete integrity and 
goodwill, are able to convince themselves that they choose and interpret the news 
objectively and on the basis of professional news values.  Within the limits of filter 
constraints they often are objective; the constraints are so powerful, and are built into the 
                                                 
3 Chomsky, Noam and Edward Herman.  Manufacturing Consent.  New York: Pantheon Books, 1988. 
7 
system in such a fundamental way, that alternative bases of news choices are hardly 
imaginable.4”  These filters act to define the system and limit what is considered to be 
acceptable public opinion.  By then encouraging debate and consenting views within 
those boundaries, people are given the impression that there is free thinking going on and 
objectivity on the part of the media.  In actuality the system definitions and boundaries 
are being reinforced by the limits placed on the debate. 
There is no formal censorship in the US, but there is a sort of market censorship.  
That is, mainstream media do not want to run stories that will offend their advertisers and 
owners.  In this way, the media end up censoring themselves and not reporting on many 
important issues including, for example, corporate practices.  Another effect of these 
market forces is that mainstream media will focus on what will sell, and news coverage 
becomes about attracting viewers rather than informing the public.  Objective coverage 
takes a backseat to the economic demands of running a news business.  Stories and 
investigations may not get aired or printed for internal political reasons, rather than 
reasons that would question journalistic integrity.  News and information are subject to 
partiality and unbalanced coverage and even omissions of major issues.  In the absence of 
self or organizationally imposed censorship, this can be caused outright bias on the part 
of the reporters or news editors who are responsible first for choosing the news and 
second for getting it out to the people, or simply by gatekeeping, a part of the story 
selection process. 
Gatekeeping is the process by which a handful of news items are selected for use 
by the media from the countless possible stories that exist.5  The temporal and geographic 
path from story to news is a channel with gates along the way representing multiple 
decision and action points where a story will either move on, be discarded, or be 
transferred to another decision channel.  Story rejections are based on judgments of 
newsworthiness, space concerns and whether the story is original or simply a rehashing 
or refresher of previous work.  Timeliness, cost, and investment value also play roles.  
Gatekeeping is not limited to the editors and producers that have the final word on the 
                                                 
4 Ibid, p. 2. 
5 Livingston, Steven.  “Suffering in Silence: Media Coverage of War and Famine in Sudan.”  In 
Rotberg, Robert I and Thomas G. Weiss.  From Massacres to Genocide: the Media, Public Policy, and 
Humanitarian Crises.  Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1996, p. 68. 
8 
content of the final product.  It begins much further back in the life of a story with the 
contact point between a reporter and source; if they never meet there is no story and the 
same results if the reporter decides not to pursue the information given. 
 
Example: Sudan vs. Somalia 
Comparing the coverage of war and famine in Sudan with that in Somalia, 
shows some of the factors in media gatekeeping, many of which have nothing to do with 
the event itself.  Similar conditions existed at the same time in each country, but Somalia 
became the focus of media attention and from that, humanitarian aid.  The major 
concerns that arise for the US media in deciding whether or not to cover such an event 
are: the location and nationality of the victims, the foreign policy orientation of the US 
government, and the accessibility of the affected areas to the press corps.  For Sudan and 
Somalia, the only difference was that coverage by the media was made easier by the 
logistics of operating in Somalia.  With so much to cover with limited time and resources, 
journalists go in the direction of least resistance.6  Keeping this in mind, the decision was 
made unconsciously for the press team because of the resources available to them in-
country.  The media had appropriate equipment, transportation, and staff already on the 
ground in Somalia and the relative sizes of the two countries made the smaller Somalia 
easier to cover.  Legal impediments to press movement and reporting in Sudan, 
harassment by the military and denial of entry and exit visas made that option even less 
attractive.   
Additionally, there is the drama factor in any story.  It is difficult to 
maintain public interest in a story that drags on year after year, where on the other hand 
an intense and concentrated crisis will always draw an audience.  A trigger event 
depicting a sharp dramatic change in conditions is needed to bring public attention to a 
possibly long term or existing situation.  The public needs to be satisfied that their 
interest in the story will be justified.  The collapse of Somalia as a nation state was such 
an event.  Because the media were already covering Somalia due to the superior reporting 
conditions in that nation, public attention was focused there, making it prudent policy-
                                                 
6 Ibid, p. 82. 
9 
wise for the US to get involved in a more official capacity despite the lack of any vital 
national interest.  Sending in troops in any capacity automatically makes the US public 
interested, no matter where the event is or the circumstances.  It gives them a direct 
personal link to the crisis, which in turn motivates the press into greater coverage to give 
the audience what they want.  Livingston’s study of Washington Post articles showed 
spikes in Somalia coverage during the period between 1991 and 1994 when the US 
became more involved and sent troops to the region.7 
 
C. PROCESSING THE NEWS 
The mass media is the only source of political information for the majority of the 
public because generally it is too far removed from their personal lives to have a contact 
that will serve as a primary information source.  Beyond the question of how the news is 
presented by the various media outlets after story selection, is how the public processes 
the information that is made available. 
 
1. Story Selection by the Audience  
The sheer volume of information available through newspapers, television, and 
lately the Internet makes information overload a real risk for the average American; they 
have to process the news to cut down on the quantity before trying to make sense of it.  
They really only pay attention to a small amount of the available information, and then 
build up an internal database of information with accompanying perceptions and 
opinions.  This is especially true of news stories, which are pre-processed before the 
audience sees them and shaped to present the meanings that the journalist has assigned.  
The audience is more likely to simply accept the stories as given rather than forming their 
own opinions about the contents because that would be too difficult without the 
background information and evidence used by the journalist to reach the conclusions.  
Such information is usually not presented with the story due to time and space constraints 
imposed by newspaper and television news formats, resulting in a preprocessed and 
usually one-sided story product for the audience to absorb.  Subjects preselected by 
                                                 
7 Ibid, pp. 74-75. 
10 
others and impoverished in detail have a decreased chance of being processed carefully 
by the audience, and news stories are a perfect example.8  Due to the low interaction level 
required by television, this easy-acceptance effect comes more into play for viewers of 
the evening news rather than newspaper readers.  They do not have to consciously watch 
the broadcast for their minds to pick up information unconsciously and store it for later 
use.  Newspapers, on the other hand, require that the readers be more involved in the 
news and take a more personal stake in processing the information provided.     
To prevent information overload, people need a strategy for excluding news and 
selecting what they want to know from the vast amount of information presented 
everyday.  To do this, they monitor news sources using a personal criteria set to 
determine which stories are important and then ignore the rest, normally an automatic 
process done without conscious thought.  In a study on the reading habits of newspaper 
subscribers, Graber found that 67% of the stories were ignored completely and of the 
33% that were noticed, about half were read completely while the rest were just skimmed 
for pertinent information.  The readers were influenced in their story choices by different 
techniques of media cueing including: use of pictures, headline size, position in the paper, 
and placement of the article on the page.  Half of the articles that drew attention were on 
the front page, and 70% of those that were read all the way through were in the first 
section.   
Part of the reason for the reader’s interest in stories being so focused toward the 
front of the paper has to do with the paper’s organization.  Articles which the journalists 
and editors determine are most important are placed first. The information contained 
within each article is presented the same way, in a pyramid style, starting with specific 
and interesting details right below the headline and getting more general as the reader 
progresses down the column.  Interest is also drawn by the amount of press given to a 
single topic in terms of both space and repetition, the use of eye-catching phrases or 
keywords in headlines and opening paragraphs, and cues from the social environment 
that tell them what issues are important enough to garner their attention.   
                                                 
8 Graber, Doris A.  Processing the News: How People Tame the Information Tide.  New York: 
Longman Inc., 1988, p. 8. 
11 
Even though people have a set of criteria for selecting stories, they do not use it in 
a careful or systematic fashion, usually resorting to skimming or scanning the news and 
waiting for something of interest to jump out at them.  It is easy to miss a story that is 
important or interesting because of the method most people use to read the daily paper.  
Additionally, reading an article or watching the news on television does not guarantee 
that the audience will process the information or even be able to recall it at a later date.  
Most adults see the news as something to keep up with out of habit or obligation or as a 
way to follow a specific topic, and as such do not give the entire paper or news broadcast 
their full attention, preferring to concentrate on the important headlines and stories with a 
personal significance to the individual.  In fact, 61% of the stories remembered by the 
Graber panelists were due to personal relevance, emotional appeal, or societal 
importance.  Some stories are rejected because the presentation is confusing to the 
audience member or because it conflicts with their preconceived notions of the world. 
The public is interested in easy access news, they do not want to have to work 
hard in order to stay informed, which is difficult to avoid if a story challenges too many 
of their ideas.  Additionally, to combat information overload, the public has a tendency to 
economize on information processing by focusing on only conclusion reached by the 
journalist and the general meaning presented by the story.  Skimming newspaper articles, 
the brief story treatment offered by television news, and the lack of serious commitment 
to studying the news all prevent the public from truly learning from the media.  Stories 
are not structured or presented properly for true learning, but they can serve to present 
new ideas for consideration that may influence future thoughts and actions. 
 
2. Audience Learning 
12 
Selecting a story for attention does not guarantee that the audience will retain the 
information or adopt the views that are presented.  There are other concerns that factor 
into audience learning.  The nature of the message is an important factor in first attracting 
and then holding audience attention long enough to make an impact and get the point 
across.  Redundancy, length, public interest, ease of access, format and subject matter are 
all aspects of news stories that can draw attention.  The response by various audience 
members to the media’s use of these techniques varies from person to person and by the 
motivations that each one has for processing and learning from what is presented.  
Journalists and other media players will use audience motivations to their advantage in 
presenting the news.   
Like any business, media outlets require customers (in the form of their audience) 
in order to remain in business.  To ensure a stable client base, they treat the evening news 
as a form of pseudo-entertainment to entice viewers to tune in every night by choosing 
stories based on their potential to grab attention rather than simple objectivity and the 
desire to keep the public informed.  The viewing public is just as bad, since they have 
been socially trained from an early age in the recreational use of television; training that 
causes the evening news to be watched for two categories of items: information that is 
personally important and information that provides psychological gratification.  Besides 
choosing their news based on entertainment value, people will generally tend to avoid 
stories that conflict with knowledge, attitudes and feelings that they already possess or 
that may threaten or disturb them.  Conversely, they seek out reassuring information or 
that which is congruent with their own mindset.  People will of course be exposed to 
information that is undesirable, but exposure is not the same as processing and 
acceptance.  They are generally more receptive when the message is more attractive or 
has a personal stake for them.   
Media agenda setting also plays a role in audience learning.  People tend to accept 
guidance from the media in determining what information is most important and 
therefore worthy of attention.9  Agenda setting uses media cues such as the frequency of 
coverage and prominent display of important stories to draw attention to certain issues 
and cause the audience to take them seriously.  Most of the time the public is willing to 
follow the media’s lead and adopt the views presented because it is the easiest way to 
make judgments, especially when the audience does not have the background required to 
fully process issues like foreign policy decisions.  The public is likely, however, to ignore 
media cues when their minds are already made up on an issue.  This will happen when 
the audience member has a personal stake in the story, considers themself an expert on 
the subject, or can personally contradict the presented views.   
                                                 
9 Ibid, p. 132. 
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Story context and audience attitudes are additional factors that contribute to or 
hinder learning from the media.  Cognitive and social skills learned throughout life 
determine people’s responses and actions to different types of information and ways of 
presenting it.  Knowledge gained from the audience’s environment and experiences 
affects how each individual will focus on and process a story.  Those with backgrounds 
appropriate to the story in question will be able to analyze it and think critically about the 
issue before rendering judgment.  Without the necessary background, there is not enough 
interest generated for critical thought and the audience members will be unable to see the 
information in the appropriate context and must therefore either accept what the media 
presents or ignore it.   
The audience is more likely to pay attention to and believe the stories presented 
by the media if the source is credible, regardless of their personal knowledge of the 
subject.  This is especially true if the source is considered an expert or an insider with 
special knowledge of a situation, such as a politician or a senior military officer 
discussing foreign policy concerns or actions.  Trust in the source increases when the 
audience has little or no personal knowledge of a topic or situation.  By relying on the 
media as their only source of information for foreign affairs, the public allows itself to 
adopt the views presented by the trusted experts even though the presentation is usually 
one sided and incomplete. 
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Stories presented by the media are subject to pre-processing before they ever 
reach the public.  To meet the time and space demands of newspapers and television 
broadcasts, details are lost and the stories themselves become more abstract as a single 
theme or meaning is brought out by the journalist.  By choosing what to emphasize, the 
media frames the news without even knowing it.  Focusing on a single issue gives the 
story a slant leading to an overall meaning and inferences that the audience will draw 
from the story and retain even after the particulars of the specific story are forgotten.  
Remembering only the main ideas and themes of a piece helps the public to deal with 
information overload, but it also makes it more difficult for people to think critically 
about issues since so many details and background information are lost or never 
presented.  Audience members instead usually look at big picture ideas when watching 
the news and selecting stories for their personal attention.  When a story is selected, it 
becomes part of their mindset and may be used to select additional stories in the future.  
Difficulties arise when the information presented is questionable or unpleasant, resulting 
in rejection of the story regardless of the subject.   
People are reluctant to change their minds, but odds are new information that 
clashes with previously held notions may cause reassessment and a change of viewpoints 
if enough new information is presented by a trusted source.  This is especially true when 
the media are the main source of information on a particular subject.  In politics and 
foreign affairs, people rely primarily on culturally provided explanations, which are 
largely supplied by the media.  In other areas with which the public is more personally 
involved, such as taxes, individual viewpoints are less likely to change due to media 
effects.  Influence of this kind only works when the audience relies on the media for 
information and recognizes the fact that they themselves do not have the background to 
make sound critical judgments on a particular subject.  “The media make major 
contributions to schema formation and development by providing the public with 
partially processed information in various domains of knowledge and by signaling the 
relative importance of stories.  This information is particularly pervasive in those areas 
where people have few chances to acquire information through personal sources.10”  
The public relies on the media to track events, thus creating a context for future 
actions and judgments, trusting them to provide a complete picture when that is not 
possible.  Media goals of speed and scooping other outlets are in direct conflict with 
public use.  What results from media organization and format styles is story shortening, 




Media are closely linked to public opinion and public policy.  Media attention to 
an issue affects decision making because policymakers understand that mass media 
shapes public opinion and they want public opinion on their side.  Because we live in a 
fast paced world and because of the public’s sometimes limited attention span, the media 
                                                 
10 Ibid, p. 263. 
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may cover a story prominently but only for a short period of time.  This short lived 
saturation can dilute the media’s impact.  Once the media push ends, it has little direct 
effect on public policy.  Media coverage can be most effective when it focuses intensely 
on an issue over a long time period, but journalists will cover an issue only when there is 
an angle that makes the story timely and newsworthy.  These two qualities often work at 
cross principles because when a story looses its punch and is shelved, public attention 
turns away and the issue is forgotten or deemed less important because of the seeming 
loss of support from the media. 
 
1. Media Effects 
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The mass media act as a communication tool within the policy community, 
allowing indirect interaction between groups such as government officials and grassroots 
organizations that would normally not speak together on a normal basis.  The media acts 
as a conduit allowing influence groups, organizations, and others to communicate with 
both the public and with decision makers in Washington DC by effectively getting their 
message out to the media.  Second, the press also helps to intensify and accelerate 
movements that have already begun through other channels.  Mass media rarely start a 
movement, but they can pick up an idea that originated elsewhere and accelerate its 
development or magnify its impact.  Third, public opinion affects policymakers.  Many 
are elected officials or appointed official who know they need the public on their side in 
order to stay in office.  The media influence and are influenced by public opinion, as they 
try to give readers and viewers information about issues that they care about.  The result 
is that government officials rely on the media as a means of monitoring the state of public 
opinion on subjects like which issues the public feels need to be addressed and how well 
government is doing addressing them.  Public opinion is a powerful force that directs 
government to do something, or more often, constrains government from doing 
something.  An issue that is prominent in the media either influences or reflects public 
opinion (sometimes both,) and public opinion sways policymakers.  Finally, the media’s 
importance varies among players.  Insiders, such as administration officials, have easy 
access to key government decision makers and have less need for media coverage than 
outsiders.  Activists, lobbyists, and others may have little access to officials and must go 
to some lengths to gain their attention.  While media rarely create news, or directly force 
issues to the government’s agenda, they can be a powerful force in stepping up the battle 
and encouraging open communication between policy makers, interest groups, and the 
general public. 
Changes in the way issues are presented by the media have been shown to cause 
dramatic shifts in public preferences.  A study by Krosnick and Brannon (1993) used 
survey data to demonstrate that media refocusing played a large part in President Bush’s 
popularity in 1992.11  The media use their reputations and platform to set agendas among 
the public and change public attitudes and opinions about news issues.  The vast majority 
of the people are very receptive to the source and therefore the message.  It is not that 
public opinions are manufactured in whole by the media, but they are influenced in subtle 
and sometimes not so subtle ways.   
For various reasons discussed above, reporters see themselves as presenting 
objective stories when in actuality choices made in the investigative and reporting 
process causes them to frame the news in certain ways and thus preventing the audience 
from making a balanced assessment or from getting the whole story.  Individuals on both 
sides of the story may be unaware of the frame.  Reporters simply see their way of 
presenting a story as objective reporting and the public sees news from a respected source 
and unconsciously makes the judgment that the view presented is the dominant or correct 
one to hold.  In most cases the framing is not intentional, it is caused by organizational 
policies and structures and the natures of the formats through which the public receives 
their news and processes it.  Journalists are socialized into certain ways of telling stories; 
they work within a given language and frame out of habit and training unconsciously.12  
The story’s construction alters its meaning through emphasis, structure, and point of 
view, all of which are seen by the reporter as objective journalistic techniques rather than 
tools of influence. 
 
 
                                                 
11 Rhoads, Kelton.  “Media Framing,” Working Psychology: Introduction to Influence.  
http://www.workingpsychology.com/mediafr.html, 26 February 2002. 
12 Benthall, Jonathan.  Disasters, Relief and the Media.  New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers & Co. Ltd, 
1993, p. 191. 
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2. Agenda Setting Function of the Press 
Editors and journalists are influenced in story choice by organizational concerns, 
competition, and personal advancement, more so than by political motivations.  But the 
political ramifications of their choices about what is news are huge since policy makers 
do not usually take notice of issues that are not important to the public.  Through agenda 
setting, the media makes issues important to the public and thus to the policy makers who 
will then take action.  Events that are not given exposure in this fashion are not taken 
seriously.  On the flip side, politicians not take seriously by networks are not by the 
public either.  Public figures must be careful about how their own actions (or lack 
thereof) are portrayed by the media for the good of their own reputation and security in 
office. 
The public does not have direct access to candidates or the sources of issues in 
their everyday lives, so they allow the media to act as their main source for information 
and also for the context in which that information is to be seen and processed.  Exposure 
to information via the mass media jump-starts a thought process in the viewer or reader 
that begins with awareness, which is processed into information, then transformed into 
attitudes, and finally applied as behavior.13  The news media, especially editors, set the 
agenda and determine which issues are important by choosing certain stories to be printed 
or aired over others, thus creating images of public affairs and having long term effects 
on the views and priorities of their readers and viewers.  This is especially true in areas 
like politics and foreign affairs where the public at large has little personal or direct 
contact and the media is the primary or only source of information.  The information 
presented is an edited reality because of the time and space constraints of print and 
broadcast media as well as the various other concerns that editors and producers must 
deal with to get the news out. 
Public opinion about which issues are important are most often found to be in line 
with those reported by prominent news organizations.   Survey based studies of media 
agenda setting show a clear relationship between what the news reports and what the 
public thinks about.  Newspapers and television do not necessarily tell the public what to 
                                                 
13 McCombs, Maxwell E. and Donald L. Shaw.  “The Agenda-Setting Function of the Press.”  In 
Graber, Doris A.  Media Power in Politics.  Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1984, p. 65. 
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think, but they do set an agenda of issues, determine their relative importance, and tell the 
public how to think about them.  The media does not tell the people what to think, just 
what to think about.  A study by Inyegar, Peters, and Kinder showed that problems 
deemed important by the media become so to the public.14  They reached this conclusion 
by creating differently arranged news programs, each with an emphasis on one particular 
issue, and showing them to groups of viewers who were asked to complete pre- and post-
viewing questionnaires to record their viewpoints and monitor any changes.  An analysis 
of the subject’s responses showed a shift in responses in line with the emphasis of each 
group’s specially themed news program.  There was an impact made in the amount of 
importance that the issues were given in relation to others, showing that network news 
does have a effect in shaping public opinion via agenda setting.  One reason is because 
the public at large is unable to get out and see all the issues and events for themselves, 
someone has to present them and the people look to the media to perform this service.   
Reliance on television as a learning device by a greater number of Americans is 
causing the interpretive and interactive skills of the populace through disuse.  It is much 
easier for the general public to accept information as presented and pre-processed by the 
media than to develop their own agendas and critical views of the issues.  Also, it is often 
the only way to learn about the issues.  Constraints on story presentation make it 
impossible for full stories with complete background information to be told.  Only the 
end product of the reporters interviews, research, and editing is presented to the public; 
they get the conclusions without seeing any of the evidence or the train of thought that 
led to them.  When there is not enough information to draw your own conclusion, it is 
simply easier to accept the one that is given.  Television viewers are especially 
susceptible to this phenomenon as speeches are reduced to sound bites and even the lead 
story is seldom given more than a minute of airtime.  Television also requires a much 
lower level of participation from the audience than does any other form of media, making 
the reception of information from the evening news almost effortless.  With fewer 
barriers between the information and the audience, the short presentation of stories, and 
                                                 
14 Iyengar, Shanto, Mark D. Peters and Donald R. Kinder.  “Experimental Demonstrations of the ‘Not-
so-Minimal’ Consequences of Television News Programs.”  In Graber, Doris A.  Media Power in Politics.  
Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1984, pp. 54-60. 
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the choice of news to attract viewers (pseudo-entertainment) television broadcasts are 
perfectly arranged for agenda setting. 
Gatekeepers pick the stories and then also decide the length, content, presentation 
style, and position in the newscast or paper.  Audiences then weigh said stories in a 
similar fashion in their own minds, possibly subconsciously, but when the story is 
recalled later so will its assigned status.  Status-conferral, stereotyping, and image-
making all result from the press presenting an object’s attributes in certain ways, and the 
more a press covers a topic stressing these points, the more likely the audience is to 
absorb and learn the information in the way it is presented.  Story placement, frequency 
and the authority of the reporters and sources gives stories their importance.  Opinions 
that are most often and most prominently covered have the best chance to influence 
perceptions.  Reports placed at the top of news programs are more likely to influence the 
public agenda than non-lead stories because stories that appear first tend to matter more 
in the eyes of the public.15  For the same reason, front page material in the morning paper 
is also seen as being more important and more likely to be read and remembered. 
 
Example: Presidential Elections 
In the first empirical investigation based specifically on agenda setting by 
the media, McCombs and Shaw polled voters in Chapel Hill, NC during the 1968 
presidential election.16  They found substantial correlations between the issues covered 
by the media and what undecided voters saw as the key issues.  Overall, their views 
reflected a composite of the press coverage rather than being skewed towards the voter’s 
favorite candidate or self-described political views. 
During the 1980 US Presidential election, the media focused mainly on 
Carter’s failures in dealing with the Iranian hostage crisis.  Nothing was said directly 
against him, but the slant of the reports was decidedly negative, enough to shape public 
opinion against him and undermine his re-election campaign.  Viewers primed with news 
                                                 
15 Nacos, Brigitte L.  Terrorism & the Media: From the Iranian Hostage Crisis to the Oklahoma City 
Bombing.  New York: Columbia University Press, 1994, p. 25. 
16 McCombs, Maxwell E. and Donald L. Shaw.  “The Agenda-Setting Function of the Press.”  In 
Graber, Doris A.  Media Power in Politics.  Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1984, p. 67. 
20 
of the hostage crisis were more likely to judge Carter’s performance as president based 
on those than people who did not see the same stories.17   
 
3. Effects on Decision-Makers 
Not only does agenda setting by the media have an effect on the public’s views of 
the issues, but those of government decision makers as well.  The emphasis placed on 
certain stories may force the president and congress to take actions they would not 
otherwise have chosen and also influence the timing of such actions.  Viewed from the 
other side, news stories also shape the image of the president and current office holders as 
seen by the public and other influential actors.  The mass media, through news stories, act 
as communications channels between otherwise unconnected parts of government, 
constituents, and organizations throughout the country and the world. 
Reality as refracted through the lens of the news media is for most people their 
only glimpse at what is going on at the White House.18  What the media presents has 
consequences for both sides, the public and the politicians because news organizations 
are significant actors in the US political system.  They serve to determine public 
perception of issues, interpret leaders actions, influence elections, and also legitimize or 
delegitimize people and actions.  The White House sees relations with the media as 
determining reputation and prestige because of the effects stories have on public opinion.  
Stories about the president and other decision-makers reflect the opinions of influentials 
in Washington that have the ear of the press.  It is easier for reporters to turn to long time 
sources who they know will consent to interviews than to develop new contacts for every 
issue; as part of the story choice process both the public figures and the reporters are 
using each other to their own advantage—to get their message out or further their own 
careers.  Opinions and views on issues thus go from influentials in Washington through 
the media and direct to the public where they shape and reflect the perception of the 
President as a leader.  The levels of support a leader is receiving affect the way the media 
                                                 
17 Nacos, Brigitte L.  Terrorism & the Media: From the Iranian Hostage Crisis to the Oklahoma City 
Bombing.  New York: Columbia University Press, 1994, p. 12. 
18 Grossman, Michael B. and Martha J. Kumar.  “The Refracting Lens.”  In Graber, Doris A.  Media 
Power in Politics.  Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1984, p. 197. 
21 
cover him, which in turn can force a reaction from the White House or Congress in issues 
that may not have surface through normal bureaucratic channels. 
 
E. WAR AND HUMANITARIAN SITUATIONS 
1. Media and the Military in War 
Propaganda comes into play in the media, especially in times of war or other 
occasions where troops are deployed to the field.  The media portrays a negative image of 
the enemy and reinforces it with rhetoric in support of their own side, leading to a further 
problem with double standards and hypocrisy than already established by both story 
choice and placement.  Common media tactics include: using selective stories that come 
across as being wide-covering and objective, presentation of partial facts, and offering 
judgments and conclusions without including the supporting evidence and chain of 
reasoning that led to them.  What results is a shortcut in the reasoning process that takes 
away the possibility of critical thought and analysis from the audience and encourages 
them to accept the judgment as presented, as fact.   
The media are not alone in their manipulation of the facts.  During time of war 
(and even during peace) the military operates in a similar fashion by restricting the 
information presented to the media and hence what the public is told.  These different 
layers of omission, framing, and analysis that occur before stories come to press or are 
shown on the evening news, cause media coverage of conflicts to degrade in quality and 
objectiveness.  Ottosen identifies the following key stages of a military campaign to 
soften up public opinion through the media in preparation for an armed intervention.19  
These are: 
• The Preliminary Stage – during which the country concerned comes to the 
news, portrayed as a cause for mounting concern because of poverty, 
dictatorship or anarchy; 
• The Justification Stage – during which big news is produced to lend urgency 
to he case for armed intervention to bring about a rapid restitution of 
normality; 
                                                 
19 The Peace Journalism Option.  Taplow Court, Buckinghamshire UK, 25-29 August 1997.  Text of 
conference findings available at: http://www.poiesis.org/pjo/pjotext.html. 
22 
• The Implementation Stage – when pooling and censorship provide control of 
coverage; 
• The Aftermath – during which normality is portrayed as returning to the 
region, before it once again drops off the news agenda. 
 
The military wants to present stories that will support their campaign, while on 
the other hand, journalists are supposed to be critical and objective.  The mission of the 
military is to fight and win whatever conflict they are involved in, preferably on the 
battlefield, but the battle of the story, specifically in public opinion and in history books, 
is just as vital.  The press can often be seen as working at cross purposes with the military 
by discovering and reporting on stories that do not help the mission objective or do not 
follow the policies and viewpoints set out by the public affairs office.  The military tries 
to avoid these problems by holding periodic press briefings, training up public affairs 
officers, and maintaining a friendly relationship with media representatives.  This is 
advantageous in two ways, good relations with the press can prevent the release of stories 
that are potentially damaging (especially strategically and tactically) and also maintaining 
contacts within the media ensures that the party line will have a voice.   
Military and government decision makers must make use of media relationships 
to manage the flow of information to the public in order to keep public opinion in line 
with national objectives.  Proper media management, one facet of information warfare, is 
as critical to the battle as superior strategy against the enemy.  Because of this, media 
organizations are often subject to constraints by the government while covering conflicts, 
not only for the safety of the troops and civilians in the fighting area but also to keep 
homefront morale and support for the troops up.  In order to properly prepare the public 
for war, it is sometimes necessary to shelve more objective and balanced reporting in 
favor of a more one-sided presentation. 
 
Example: Vietnam 
During US involvement in Vietnam, press coverage served to further 
confuse the issues at hand and pave the way for public unrest and anti-war sentiments 
which made the military’s job even more difficult.  The media served to magnify the 
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inconsistencies and brutalities of the war, often going against the information put out by 
the President.  This trend was slow to develop with the press starting out on the pro-war 
side and then gradually changing as the war turned out to be difficult and victory was not 
quick as had been predicted.  Cameras and reporters in the field with their daily updates 
from the combat zone captured the brutality of the war and focused on civilian deaths and 
US losses, serving to stretch the war timeline, making it seem endless to the people at 
home.   
Walter Cronkite, often cited as the most trusted man in America at the 
time, symbolized the consensus of the people.  His views changed when those of the 
public changed, gradually at first, and then more rapidly as he spoke out against the war, 
using his prestige and power to convince the American people to join him in his beliefs.20  
At the beginning of the war effort, he accepted the official line and used his credibility to 
amplify it.  He gave the benefit of the doubt, as did the rest of the country, to government 
and military leaders since they knew what they were doing since war was their business.  
Limited broadcast time, frustrated and alienated field reporters, and the emphasis on 
bloody footage made the war seem both endless and hopeless.  As this continued, the 
country and Cronkite were effected by this attitude, increasing doubts as to the 
righteousness of the action.   
The real change in reporting was marked by the Tet Offensive of 1968, 
during which Vietcong troops were caught on film for the first time showing valor, 
courage and durability, the exact opposite of what US propaganda had been saying about 
their sneak attacks and cowardly actions.  For the first time, the public saw that the US 
may actually be on the wrong side of the conflict, and that the President and government 
officials misled them to get involved in the first place and continued to mislead them to 
stay involved.  It changed the way Cronkite and other anchors and reporters viewed the 
war.  No longer were they reluctant to air doubt and pessimism, in fact Cronkite went to 
Saigon shortly after Tet to see the action for himself.  He was shocked to see that the 
fighting was still going on while the generals were telling him that the battle was over.  
His conclusion: the men in charge could not be trusted, they had lost their credibility over 
                                                 
20 Halberstam, David.  “Televising the Vietnam War.”  In Graber, Doris A.  Media Power in Politics.  
Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1984, pp. 290-295. 
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Tet and it was his job to let the American people know.  Disillusioned by what he had 
seen in the field, Cronkite shed his objectivity and made a thirty minute personal 
broadcast in which explained why the war was not working and how the US had to start 
thinking about getting out of Vietnam.21 
Public consensus had already begun to shift to a more anti-war stance, and 
this broadcast changed the balance, finally pushing it over the edge and giving the 
movement a boost.  President Johnson respected Cronkite personally and viewed his 
attitude change as a sign that he had lost the support of average Americans in his 
continued support of the war.  The President recognized the media’s role as both a 
barometer for and influence on public opinion, and realized that once he reached this 
point there was no salvaging it or turning it back in his favor.  In response he announced 
his intention to not seek re-election and continued with the war he could not win until 
leaving office.  Lessons learned in Vietnam contribute greatly to military handling of the 
press today. 
 
2. Media and Humanitarian Crises 
a. Informing the Public  
Media are a very powerful force in American political and social life.  
They tell people what to think about and how various issues rank in terms of importance 
simply by the nature and amount of coverage an event receives.  This is especially true 
for events in the third world and for international humanitarian crises where media plays 
a decisive role in determining both political and popular concern, due to the fact that the 
mass media are the only source of information in such circumstances.  Coverage does not 
change the importance of an event, only its impact.  Media attention, particularly if not 
sustained, may not be sufficient to generate a response,  but it is necessary to inform the 
world that the event is occurring.22  There can be no response if the actors with the 
appropriate resources to help are not informed and there is no motivation for them to act.  
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In the case of humanitarian events, this motivation is generally public outrage at the 
unfairness of the situation and sympathy for the victims.  For example, in Bosnia and 
Somalia media presence made decisive action politically difficult to avoid because 
coverage made the public aware of events that government officials had been following 
for some time. 
The media are essential in humanitarian crisis management, prevention, 
mitigation, and resolution.  They serve to link victims, relief personnel, government 
officials, and the public.  Most importantly, they are used to motivate public, political, 
and institutional responses to these events and to support rational policy-making and 
priority setting by decision-makers.23  Difficulties arise, however when the speed of 
reporting interferes with the accuracy of the report and public attention is misinformed or 
misfocused, leading to faulty decision-making and inappropriate actions in response to 
the report rather than the actual event. 
 
b. Media Distortion 
Humanitarian crises create problems and put additional limitations on the 
media by virtue of their locations and the players involved.  Accuracy suffers because of 
time and distance constraints.  It is not feasible for reporters on the ground to research a 
story thoroughly when they are constantly trying to scoop their peers.  Additionally, low 
technology third world nations make in depth research very time consuming, and often 
pointless if the desired records do not exist or are being held by a regime that is hostile to 
the press and others who try to interfere.  Distortions that result from incomplete or 
incorrect information may lead to inappropriate actions by responding agencies and 
governments designed to fix the reported problem when that may not be the issue at all.  
As a result, public confidence in the government’s ability to resolve the problem 
decreases along with public support, which in turn makes it difficult for policy makers to 
take action—a viscous cycle.   
Distortions also arise because of what journalists and other media 
gatekeepers think qualifies as news.  They want to attract and hold public attention with 
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what they report, so they publicize stories that will get ratings and downplay or ignore 
issues that are not of vital interest to their audience and events that are too slowly 
developing to rate a headline.  Humanitarian crises and other international events too 
often fall in this category because the American populace at large has no context to put 
them in due to differences in culture, circumstances, and political and social situations 
that exist in the affected areas.  These misunderstandings are compounded by audience 
exposure to only select stories.  One-sided, overly negative and limited reports on 
conditions and events in other nations create a very limited image in the mind of 
Americans of what life is like in the third world.  Such reports cause erroneous 
conclusions to be drawn about the root causes of events and what actions if any need to 
be taken to fix the problems that exist.  Broadcast news is especially guilty, focusing on 
event based coverage because of the limited airtime available, typically sixty to ninety 
seconds for the top story with the rest relegated to sound bytes.  There simply is not 
enough time allowed to cover an issue that develops over weeks, months, or even years, 
the public’s attention span is too short and they lose interest too quickly.  As a result, 
issues and possible solutions are simplified through pre-processing and then served up to 
an audience keeping up with the news more out of obligation than any real desire to 
learn. 
More information does not necessarily mean that the public and the 
decision-makers are better informed of events in the world.  It simply means that there is 
more information and thus a greater potential for information overload, especially with 
24-hours news outlets such as CNN and the expanding use of the Internet for instant 
news.  If anything, this is serving to further shorten the attention span of the American 
public and forcing them to choose a small selection of regular proven outlets from which 
to get their news and information.  Protecting themselves from overload in this fashion 
has a huge effect on the public’s perception of events because they are voluntarily 
restricting themselves to a minimal number of news sources and thus a minimal number 
of opinions and slants on the stories presented.  The sheer amount of information, number 
of sources and the choices of program directors and editors based on popularity, ratings 
and current trends, are all concerns drawing journalists attention away from simply 
keeping the public informed.    
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Reporters go where the story is and where public interest is focused, and 
after a time that interest wanes, especially in the face of humanitarian crises a world away 
that have no direct impact on everyday lives in this country.  A steady stream of stories 
from the front lines of the crisis result in eventual compassion fatigue and burnout among 
people who feel that they cannot personally make a difference.24  Once this stage is 
reached, the public loses interest and the media pulls out, looking for the next big 
headline that will grab their audience’s attention.  The presence of the press is vital to 
maintain public support for international relief operations, because it keeps the crisis in 
focus.  Once public attention fades and the media pulls out, relief efforts lose support as 




The media can only deal with one major issue at a time; there can only be 
one top story.  Political and other organizational decisions that go into making the choice 
of which story it will be, pushes others out of the spotlight.  Lack of reporting results in a 
failure to prompt sufficient public attention and interest to effect timely action by 
governments, relief organizations, and other actors.  This happened in Rwanda in 1994 
where there was no widespread coverage of events until the killings were termed 
genocide by the media, and even then there was no real action taken by the US or other 
actors.  In this case, there was a lot of early warning about events that were taking place, 
but media gatekeepers determined that there was not enough of a story there at the 
beginning to justify widespread coverage.  In order to grab the headlines and generate 
public interest, correspondents need to find some angle that tugs the heartstrings in a new 
way.25  There was no angle to the Rwanda story when it was “just” inter-tribal warfare, 
which the majority of Americans believe to be a constant state of affairs on the African 
continent.  Additionally, with no reporters on the ground in Rwanda there was no video 
footage of what was going on and without that, the public has no real tie-in to events 
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occurring a world away.  Rather than reporting on the escalation of events that may have 
led to nothing, the media held off until the story really broke with genocide.  By that 
time, it was too late for a meaningful intervention and such an action would never have 
had the support of the American public who had been conditioned over time to believe 
that such things were normal, over there. 
 
c. Effects on the Public and Policy-Makers 
Media have always been essential in shaping public opinion about 
mobilizing support for humanitarian crises.  Television alerts the public to disasters and 
print outlets serve to shape attitudes toward the nature of the disaster and what must be 
done in response.  But the press is unprepared and structurally unsuited to convey the full 
complexity of these types of situations to their audience.  The problem lies in conveying 
an accurate, balanced and understandable view of these complex events that most of the 
general public has no context for understanding, all within the constraints of print and 
broadcast media.  Crises need to be portrayed accurately if the appropriate response is to 
be taken, and this is just not possible with standard media operating procedures.  
Humanitarian organizations are guilty of the same thing when getting information out to 
the media; they want the simplest picture of the crisis to be broadcast so the solution 
seems simple.  It is much easier for the public to get behind a simple, understandable 
solution that they can personally do something about like donating food or money, but if 
the entire background story and history of a crisis gets out it may seem too overwhelming 
and impossible to resolve and therefore not worth public attention or assistance.  More 
often than not, the media focuses on their own best interests rather than those of the 
victims or their audience.  They forgo being simply objective and informative for the 
sensational story that will garner the largest audience and the most revenue. 
Ignorance of the true reasons behind a situation lead to inaccuracies in 
both reporting and response.  A prime example of this is Rwanda, which was conveyed as 
inevitable inter-tribal conflict that had been going on for generations so there was nothing 
that could be done to stop it.  A situation needs to reach critical mass in the public 
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consciousness before action is taken or demanded.26  The problem is not a lack of 
information; rather the way the available information is organized, analyzed, and 
presented.  The public needs a greater knowledge of countries, reliance on local sources, 
and a stronger critical edge rather than accepting current media methods and the stories 
they present as gospel.  The media needs more independence from the government in its 
story choices, more stringent standards for balanced reporting, and to focus on more 
positive stories of other nations rather than relying on reactive foreign reporting. 
Primetime television broadcasts and 24 hour news access allows rapid 
dissemination of information worldwide.  Faster, more massive and more successful 
international response to emergencies results.27  By getting the word out, the media 
creates a constituency for the victims among the public that they otherwise would not 
have.  From that a feeling of responsibility is generated, mobilizing the public, and 
through them their leaders, to act.  This is true for the beginning of the crisis, when it is 
still new and generating sympathy in the masses.  Problems arise as time goes on and the 
story fades in popularity and the media begins focusing on the more negative aspects of 
the relief efforts rather than the problem itself, which loses audience attention quickly 
through compassion fatigue.  The longer a crisis goes on, the more damaging instant 
news can be, undermining the very constituency it created because the reporters are 
looking for more headlines wherever they can find them rather than focusing on keeping 
the public informed of how the operation is proceeding or on providing support for the 
people in the field. 
Heavy media coverage is a critical influence on policy-makers.28  It also 
has a short term influence on the public in generating interest in current issues and events 
and constituencies for action.  With the short attention span of the public, this does not 
work in the long term for developing problems, only hard-hitting sensational stories that 
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demand immediate attention.  Decision-makers are affected in the same way.  They do 
not see a situation as an emergency if it does not rate prime coverage by the media, which 
is a major influence on Washington’s agenda for humanitarian crises.  Government 
leaders use the print media for background information and ideas while television 
coverage keeps them abreast of new developments and issues that need immediate 
attention and action.  Media attention plays an important role in influencing public policy 
toward humanitarian emergencies and narrowly focused situations where the solution 
seems simple and the public believes they can make a difference with relatively easy 
actions.  It does not work in other arenas where the public bows to the expertise of 
government officials and policy-makers and the courses of action that they choose.  It 
also does not work for every crisis.  Only current crises with some sort of disaster as a 
trigger event are deemed as worthy of coverage, and therefore public attention. 
Media coverage of disasters profoundly affects both public opinion and 
the policy-making process.29  Sometimes the media take on a supportive role by getting 
the word out and providing information on an event, but at other times they can be a 
major factor in decision-making.  The level of media influence and the ultimate action of 
policy-makers in response to coverage of an event depends on its importance to US 
interests, public and government awareness of the event, and the amount of publicity an 
event receives or generates.  Policy-makers will support a quick and decisive response if 
the geopolitical or national interests of the US are threatened; in which case, media 
coverage is irrelevant to the level of response.  US interests that will generate this type of 
response from policy-makers include: massive population movements such as refugee 
migration, economic collapse, and large scale natural disasters.  Any of these events can 
threaten regional stability and the authority of the governing body in the affected country, 
having negative connotations for the US and the rest of the world.   
It is when there are no US interests directly involved that media coverage 
plays an important role in focusing the attention of both policy-makers and the public on 
the crisis.  If there is no geopolitical importance inherent in the event, US and world aid 
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agencies will initiate efforts if they have the resources and do not require outside 
approval, and the fewer links there are in the decision chain, the more likely a response 
is.  Media coverage is not required for action to be taken by non-governmental 
organizations, but the publicity it generates can help gain public support for the aid 
operation and extend its life through donations of time, supplies and money.  Increased 
publicity can also cause the government to take notice and begin a supplemental relief 
effort.  For example, relief efforts for the famine in Somalia began in early 1992 even 
though there was no media coverage until June of that year.  After the story broke, 
sustained coverage contributed to the launch of Operation Restore Hope by President 
Bush, where the military were used to further relief efforts.   
 
d. Military Intervention 
The military has been historically reluctant to act as security or logistical 
support for humanitarian operations and other such poorly defined missions where US 
interests are not directly involved as a legacy of the Vietnam era.  Lack of training for 
such operations and the tendency for mission creep to escalate military presence for 
vague reasons makes the military and the public alike unwilling to accept such use of 
American forces, especially when those forces are needlessly put in danger.  The problem 
is that with the United States’ preeminence in the world, our influence as a nation is often 
needed to get other countries involved so that UN and other relief missions to succeed.  
Media coverage puts humanitarian crises on the public agenda, and that coupled with 
pressure from the UN to do something causes the public to react and force the 
government into actions that they otherwise would not take.  None of this would happen 
without the media first focusing public attention.  This does not work for all events.  
Massive media attention certainly has a hand in making policy in humanitarian 
emergencies where the US does not have direct political interests, especially in cases 
where the stories play on public emotions and they see a problem that is easily solved 
with funding or food.  The public is receptive it if can relate humanitarian crises to 
everyday life and the welfare of the country as a whole, which is why famine in Somalia 




 The media do not necessarily tell the public what to think, but do tell the public 
what to think about and also determine the public agenda.  Characteristics such as 
placement, content, slant, repetition, format and ease of access all convey a message 
about the relative importance of an article and influence how the audience perceives 
them.  Influence has the greatest effect when the stories are about something the audience 
has little or no personal experience with or context for understanding, such as foreign 
policy.  The are forced to rely on the media as their sole source of information and thus it 
is easier for them to accept the pre-processed stories, views and opinions presented rather 
than developing their own.   
Mass media do have an effect on policy through coverage, but only in the short 
term.  The public has a short attention span, which when coupled with journalists’ 
constant drive to find new stories causes headlines to change rapidly.  Too often media 
story selection is based on concerns other than objectively informing the public, causing 
events to be ignored or passed over in favor of other more newsworthy ones.  With the 
public being informed through media coverage, a trigger event worthy of media attention 
is required if first the story is to be covered, and second if influence is to occur.  The 
media has the ability to affect government policy on an issue by influencing public 
opinion, but only if that issue makes it to press and is significant enough to draw 














































III. US OPERATIONS AND POLICIES IN SOMALIA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The next step in exploring the effects of media influence on US foreign policy is 
to introduce the case study used for analysis.  This chapter provides historical background 
on the Somali Civil War and famine that led to intervention by the United Nations and 
eventually the United States in the early 1990s.  Following the history is a description of 
the UN missions to Somalia and the progression of US involvement from initial 
assistance to the events of 03 October 1993 and eventual withdrawal.  Table 3.1 at the 
end of this chapter provides a timeline highlighting important events.  Chapter IV will 




Figure 3.1 Map of Somalia 30 
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B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The early history of the Somali people can be traced to immigrants from Yemen 
who founded an Arab sultanate in the region in the Seventh century.  Somalia’s modern 
history began in the late 19th Century when European powers began trading with both 
their own colonies and other independent rulers throughout Africa.  In a desire to protect 
trading routes the British, French and Italians all concluded treaties with clan leaders in 
the area and established a permanent presence in the Horn of Africa beginning in the 
1860s.  This state of affairs remained until after the Second World War when Somalia 
was made a UN protectorate under the control of Italy for a period of 10 years.  The 
Somali Republic gained its independence on 01 July 1960. 
In June 1961, Somalia adopted its first national constitution, providing for  a 
democratic state with a parliamentary form of government.  At first, political parties 
reflected clan loyalties and created a split based on regional interests.  Additionally, there 
was conflict between pro-Arab, pan-Somali militants who wanted unification with ethnic 
Somalis in Ethiopia and Kenya and the modernists who wanted to focus on economic and 
social development while improving relations with other African nations.  The Somali 
Youth League eventually assumed control and succeeded in cutting across regional and 
clan loyalties for the good of Somalia as a whole.  Under the leadership of Mohamed 
Ibrahim Egal, prime minister from 1967 to 1969, Somalia greatly improved relations with 
its Kenyan and Ethiopian neighbors.  Democracy ended in Somalia on 21 October 1969 
when Major General Mohamed Siad Barre seized power with the support of the army and 
police forces. 
The rulers of the new Somali Democratic Republic dissolved the national 
assembly and replaced it with the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) with twenty 
members and Barre as president.  The SRC pursued the Soviet model in both ideology 
and economic policies, centralizing control of both information and production.  Under 
Barre’s leadership Somalia joined the Arab league and developed strong ties with the 
Soviet Union and other Communist nations.  In the late 1970s these ties were broken after 
Somalia began supporting ethnic Somali rebels engaged in guerilla operations in the 
Ogaden region of Ethiopia and the Soviets sided with the Ethiopians.  The US and Saudi 
Arabia backed the Somalis and the fighting continued until 1988 when Somalia and 
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Ethiopia signed a peace agreement.  Throughout the conflict the US and other western 
powers were reluctant to provide military aid in the form of hardware or troops, but did 
provide emergency airlift support on several occasions. 
With the end of the guerilla fighting, warfare among rival factions within Somalia 
intensified.  Armed domestic opposition to Barre’s regime began in the north in 1988 
with the Somali National Movement who were joined by the United Somali Congress 
(USC) and the Ogadeni Somali Patriotic Movement.  At the President’s order, aircraft 
from the Somali National Air Force bombed cities in the north where these groups were 
known to be located, striking indiscriminately at both civilian and military targets.  War 
in the north coupled with economic crisis led to further hardship as the collapsing nation 
was struck with famine and drought. 
By 1990 the northern insurgency had been largely successful, leaving very little 
of the Somali Democratic Republic.  The army had dissolved into armed groups declaring 
loyalty solely to former commanders or clan leaders.  The economy was in shambles and 
over a million Somali refugees had fled to Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen and Djibouti.  In 
1991, Barre was ousted from power by nationalistic guerillas of the USC and forced into 
Nigerian exile.  In the aftermath, two rival factions of the USC each proclaimed their own 
president.  The Abgal sub-clan declared Mohammed Ali Mahdi president and 
Mohammed Farah Aidid was chosen by the Habr Gedir, and the fighting continued in a 
brutal civil war with these two sub-clans as the main combatant factions.  Several other 
clan groups were also involved, but to a lesser degree.  The worst African drought on 
record contributed to the appalling conditions and plunged the nation into a famine that 
would claim hundreds of thousands of lives.   
 
C. US AND INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT 
Various UN agencies including the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, the World Food Program, and the United Nations Children’s 
Fund, along with other Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) had been involved in 
humanitarian assistance in Somalia since the late 1970s.  When civil war erupted in 1991, 
the UN was forced to close many of its offices in the country, which made it increasingly 
difficult for aid to reach those in need.  In 1992, responding to the political chaos and 
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rising death toll in Somalia, the UN with support from the US and other nations, launched 
United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I or Operation Provide Relief) to 
provide humanitarian relief.  This operation was followed on by the US led Unified Task 
Force (UNITAF or Operation Restore Hope) which provided military assistance to the 
humanitarian operation.  The UN took over operations again with UNOSOM II, which 
had expanded enforcement power to disarm the Somali people and start the nation-
building process. 
 
1. UNOSOM I 
The United Nations became officially involved in January of 1992 by sending an 
envoy to Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, in the person of the Under Secretary General 
for Political Affairs with the aim of bringing about a cease-fire and securing access for 
relief agencies to aid those ravaged by famine and drought as well as civilian victims of 
the Civil War.  The main factions fighting in Mogadishu, those belonging to Aidid and 
Mahdi, agreed to allow the UN to try and bring about national reconciliation and on 15 
January 1992 the interim Prime Minister made an official request to the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) to convene and take action to resolve the situation in 
Somalia.31  This marked the beginning of the chain of events that would lead to the 
establishment of UNOSOM I.  Acting on the request for help from the interim 
government, the UNSC adopted Resolution 733 to impose a general and complete 
embargo on weapons and military equipment in Somalia.32  A delegation composed of 
UN representatives, the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference convinced the warring factions to accept the 
Resolution on 3 March and implement a cease fire beginning the in capital and eventually 
spreading to the rest of the country.   
Though the cease-fire was in place, there were still some incidents of violence and 
continued difficulties with humanitarian aid reaching the needy.  The Secretary General 
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responded by sending a monitoring team to Mogadishu to ensure the terms of the 
agreement were being upheld and to determine the best way to guarantee delivery of 
humanitarian assistance.  Aidid and Mahdi, working with the representatives, signed 
agreements on 27 March to deploy UN observers and security forces to Mogadishu for 
just these purposes.  These agreements became the foundation for UNSC Resolution 751, 
authorizing UNOSOM I on 24 April.  The mission’s mandate included: monitoring the 
cease-fire, providing security for UN personnel, escorting deliveries of humanitarian 
supplies, and convening a conference on national reconciliation.33  The Security 
Council’s main goal was to guarantee humanitarian aid.  In order to do so, the nation’s 
political problems, the root cause, would have to be solved first, therefore the conference 
was included in the mandate.  On original deployment, UNOSOM I consisted of 50 
unarmed UN observers (arriving on 23 July) and 500 infantry troops (arriving on 14 
September) to provide security. 
To tackle the humanitarian aid problem, the UN launched a 90-Day Plan of action 
to bring immediate assistance to the Somali population at the same time as UNOSOM I 
received its mandate.  Results were seen quickly, as the first shipments were delivered in 
May 1992, but the overall amount was far less than was needed.  Part of the problem was 
that UNOSOM was limited to operating in the capital, rather than being deployed country 
wide.  Another major part of the problem was the lack of support the effort was receiving 
from the rest of the world due to the lack of coverage Somalia was receiving from the 
media.  The world’s focus was trained mostly on Bosnia at this point, and as discussed in 
Chapter II, the media can only handle one major story at a time.  With print journalists 
and news broadcasters drawing public attention to the Balkans, there was no room in the 
headlines for Somalia.  The Secretary General and various agencies working in-country 
helped to gain international media attention, which in turn caused the coverage to be 
expanded and forced world governments into action.34  On 27 July, the UNSC approved 
emergency airlifts to get supplies to the interior portions of the country that has 
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previously been ignored.  While this helped to get the aid to regions where it was needed, 
it was doing nothing for the overall crisis, which continued to intensify as food shipments 
were being attacked and looted by armed gangs running amok.  On the same day, UNSC 
Resolution 767 divided the country into four operational zones.35  Each zone to be staffed 
with 750 infantry troops for security, as stipulated by UNSC Resolution 775, which was 
approved on 28 August.36  Logistical support was to follow in September, but none of 
these additional troops ever existed in Somalia beyond the planning stage.  A further 100-
Day Action Program was initiated to provide aid in September, but even with increased 
coordination between NGOs and the UN armed groups and faction members continued to 
interfere with distribution by attacks, looting, and forcing the closure of ports. 
The situation became markedly worse in October when Aidid, who had 
previously agreed to UN presence and actions in Mogadishu, stated that the troops would 
no longer be tolerated and that any further deployments would be met with violence.  He 
additionally demanded the expulsion of UNOSOM’s Coordinator for Humanitarian 
Assistance.  Local faction leaders got into the act by spreading the word that the UN was 
intent on invading and taking over the country, leading to attacks on troops securing the 
airport and heavy shelling of any ships approaching port in Mogadishu.  International aid 
workers were under siege during October and November as roving gangs had deemed the 
supplies as targets either for stealing or for demanding protection money from the 
agencies attempting to deliver them.37  These ongoing problems were making it 
impossible for UNOSOM I to carry out its mandate in peacekeeping mode as written; 
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2. UNITAF 
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations permits the UNSC to authorize 
military action to restore peace and security.  Invoking this right, and with the promise of 
military support from the United States, the Security Council determined that the conflict 
in Somalia was a threat to international peace and security, and adopted Resolution 794 
on 03 December 1992.  This Resolution authorized the use of all necessary means to 
establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in 
Somalia, and also called for ongoing efforts to achieve a political settlement.38  Full 
operational command of troops for Operation Restore Hope, as UNITAF was known, was 
assumed by the US, which had the largest contingent, not the UN, though they did work 
with the UNOSOM personnel on the ground in Mogadishu.  There were 37,000 UNITAF 
troops deployed, with 28,000 belonging to the US and the remainder coming from more 
than 20 nations. 
Stated US goals in Somalia were humanitarian in nature, seeking to provide a 
secure environment to enable the free distribution of aid to the populace.  Resolution 794 
authorizing UNITAF mentioned continued efforts at achieving a political solution for 
Somalia, but the actual mission focused more on military means rather than diplomatic 
ones, and did not attempt to further the government restoration process that the original 
UN mission was focused on.  President Bush was adamant about limiting the mission to 
only providing a secure environment for aid while the UN worked with the Somalis to 
rebuild the government.  He stressed that the US mission was solely a humanitarian one: 
to get in, get the food delivered and then get out, quickly.  The UN had a different vision 
for them in terms of tasks while on the ground, but since UNITAF was under US rather 
than UN command, it followed the more limited US view of the mission.  Comments by 
General Colin Powell, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shortly before the 
Marine landing on 09 December summed up the US attitude toward the UNITAF 
mission, “It’s sort of like the cavalry coming to the rescue, straightening things out for a 
while and then letting the marshals come back to keep things under control.39” 
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UNITAF forces rejected the mission of disarming the Somali militia, which had 
been one of the main objectives of their UNOSOM predecessors.  They took a very 
limited view of what exactly “providing a secure environment” meant and did so by 
creating security zones around humanitarian aid delivery and distribution sites and the 
roads connecting them.  They made great strides toward improving conditions in the 
country on the humanitarian side, but did nothing for disarmament beyond excluding 
weapons from the security zones.  This worked while US forces were in the country, but 
the players involved knew the Americans were only in Somalia on a temporary basis and 
would be leaving in May 1993, to be replaced by a weaker UNOSOM II force.  Aidid and 
his loyal militia along with other factions bided their time until they knew the Americans 
would be gone, using the intervening months to stockpile weapons and build up their own 
forces for when they could be used to an advantage against the UN Peacekeepers.   
President Bush enforced this perception by sending in Ambassador Robert Oakley 
to negotiate a limited agreement with Aidid and Mahdi, days before the Marine landing.  
His mission was to obtain the cooperation of the warlords in a cease-fire lasting from 
December 1993 to May 1994, the predetermined length of UNITAF.40  The US used its 
reputation for arms and military credibility to get a promise of temporary cooperation 
from the Somali militia where US prestige and power could have been used to further the 
entire UN mission rather than just to make UNITAF easier to implement.   
US Marines landed on the beach in Somalia on 09 December 1992 forcing faction 
troops to withdraw to inland regions without so much as a fight.  By the next day, planes 
were landing at Mogadishu airport with supplies, the ports were made safe for ships to 
dock, and the 100-day Action Plan was finally implemented.  Additionally, UNITAF 
forces worked to repair infrastructure ensuring that delivery trucks could travel to regions 
that desperately needed emergency relief.  Improved security helped the supplies get 
delivered and also helped the NGOs to expand their programs beyond providing food to 
include both emergency and preventive medical care and medicines.  A month later, in 
January 1993, the worst of the famine was over and aid workers could begin to focus on 
long term solutions such as increasing local food production and refugee resettlement. 
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Working to solve the political problems at the root of the conflict, the Secretary 
General met with opposing faction leaders, the Organization of African Unity, the League 
of Arab States, and various community organizations and NGOs beginning on 04 January 
1993 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.  Over the two week conference, the assembled groups 
agreed to a cease-fire, disarmament, and the creation of a monitoring group consisting of 
UNITAF and UN troops, all to be completed by March in time for a further conference 
on national reconciliation.  Not all of the faction leaders stayed on course with the terms 
of the agreements, and two international aid workers were assassinated in January while 
in-fighting among the factions continued, despite partial disarmament and the presence of 
the UN teams.41  Faction leaders did meet again from 15-27 March and agree to end the 
hostilities, but with little credibility.   
UNITAF was supposed to be a temporary show of force to create a secure 
environment for the delivery of aid, and once that was accomplished to hand over control 
to a follow-on peace-keeping mission.  By the US limiting its actions so severely, the 
overall UN effort was ultimately hindered and this set the stage for the problems 
UNOSOM II encountered after assuming command from UNITAF in May 1993.  Not 
only did this operation fail to work toward disarmament or the rest of the overall UN 
mission, but it suggested to Aidid and Mahdi (the two faction leaders Oakley dealt with) 
that they had to behave while the US was in charge of the operation but could revert to 
their previous behavior of attacking humanitarian aid personnel and supplies as soon as 
the US troops were gone.  That is exactly what happened; 24 peacekeepers were killed in 
the series of ambushes that occurred on 05 June, just one month after command was 
transferred to UNOSOM II.  In addition, by choosing to deal with only these two 
warlords, Oakley inferred legitimacy to their rule in Somalia that they used to build 
power and retain control of the people during UNITAF’s mission.  Focusing solely on 
military police actions to secure aid delivery routes meant that the US forces were unable 
to counter faction power consolidation or anti-US and anti-UN movements that continued 
to gain strength. 
 
                                                 
41 The United Nations and Somalia 1992-1996.  The United Nations Blue Books Series, Volume VII.  
New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1996, p. 39. 
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3. UNOSOM II 
Reports to the UN concerning the failure of UNITAF to achieve a state of peace 
in Somalia resulted in UNOSOM II being changed from a peacekeeping mission to a 
peace-enforcement one, the first ever.  Resolution 814 was passed by the Security 
Council on 26 March 1993 expanding the size of UNOSOM and widening its mandate to 
include, beyond disarmament and creating a safe environment for humanitarian 
assistance: assisting the Somali people in rebuilding their economy and social and 
political life, re-establishing the country’s institutional structure, achieving national 
political reconciliation, recreating a Somali State based on democratic governance and 
rehabilitating the country’s economy and infrastructure.42  UNOSOM II personnel were 
authorized to use all necessary means, including enforcement to accomplish its mission.  
Command was formally transferred from UNITAF on 4 May, and the new operation was 
originally authorized through 31 October, though the last of the personnel did not depart 
until March of the following year. 
The day after UNOSOM II received its mandate, the second Addis Ababa 
conference ended with an agreement between the two main factions and thirteen others, 
to end the conflict and continue the peace process under the auspices of the UN.43  This 
agreement set out a two-year plan for the transition to a new central government, creating 
first local governments and then a Transitional National Council to interact with 
UNOSOM II and other nations and organizations until the new government was in place.  
Complete disarmament was a stipulation of the agreement, and was to be achieved within 
90 days in coordination with UNITAF/UNOSOM personnel.  UNOSOM II, in 
accordance with its expanded mandate, began implementing the Addis Ababa Agreement 
in April, but renewed tensions among the factions and open accusations and opposition to 
UNOSOM II’s efforts by factions loyal to Aidid began to cause serious problems in June.   
UNOSOM II’s much less powerful military capability made it difficult to coerce 
the faction leaders into accepting peace and cooperating with disarmament.  They were 
                                                 
42 UNSC Resolution 814, 26 March 1993.  In The United Nations and Somalia 1992-1996.  The 
United Nations Blue Books Series, Volume VII.  New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1996, 
Document 52, p. 261. 
43 Addis Ababa Agreement of the First Session of the Conference on National Reconciliation in 
Somalia.  In The United Nations and Somalia 1992-1996.  The United Nations Blue Books Series, Volume 
VII.  New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1996, Document 53, p. 264. 
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fewer in number than the departed US force (14000 versus 37000), had to cover a greater 
area as UNITAF was deployed in only strategic areas rather than country wide, and had 
less equipment and training suitable for peace-enforcement.  Under the original mandate 
for UNOSOM I, the mission was to be peacekeeping in nature.  When UNITAF stepped 
in, they were to make the country “secure” through peace-enforcement and then return 
control back to peace-keeping forces.  In limiting their operations to just protecting the 
humanitarian supplies, UNITAF forced the security council to change UNOSOM’s 
mandate to peace-enforcement and then use troops that were ill prepared for a mission of 
that nature.  There was a US Quick Reaction Force consisting of 1100 specially trained 
troops stationed off shore to respond to emergency threats against UNOSOM II, but they 
could hardly be expected to coerce the same level of cooperation from the warlords as the 
37000 UNITAF troops had previously.  
UNOSOM II was headed by UN envoy and retired US Admiral Jonathan Howe; 
the force commander was Turkish General Cervik Bir.  Several units including the 
French, Italians and the Quick Reaction Force did not necessarily obey this chain of 
command, seeking approval from their home governments before taking orders from the 
allied command.  This breakdown in the command structure caused confusion among 
UNOSOM forces and outright refusals of some orders.  In the mean time, Aidid was 
secure in his own power and began publicly decrying the UN on Radio Mogadishu, 
inciting protests against the organization’s presence in “his” country and further gaining 
the support of the people against “their enemy.” 
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Delays in troop deployments, equipment arrival and the unique challenges in 
integrating forces from countries with different languages, training and procedures all 
contributed to UNOSOM II operating below strength and ill-equipped.  In this condition, 
the forces attempted to carry out an inspection of five weapons storage facilities in 
Mogadishu on 5 June, as per the Addis Ababa Agreement.  Also pursuant to the 
agreement, the faction leaders were informed of the inspections ahead of time, and as a 
result the inspection teams were ambushed causing the deaths of 24 Pakistani 
peacekeepers and the wounding of 56 others.  This incident was a definite challenge to 
the credibility of the UN forces and to their willingness to carry out their mandate.  In 
response, the UNSC adopted Resolution 837 reaffirming that UNOSOM was authorized 
to use all necessary measures against those responsible for the armed attacks including 
their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment.44   
Due to the simultaneous nature of the ambushes on the inspection teams, the 
Security Council deemed them premeditated and identified Aidid as the mastermind 
behind them.  Resolution 837 on 06 June authorized the use of all means to find and 
punish those responsible.  This was the point where the mission stopped being about 
helping to deliver aid and became a manhunt.  The political side of the mission was 
pushed to the back burner as well, making a long term solution even less likely.  The 
focus had shifted from peace making and peace-enforcement to Aidid-hunting.  After a 
further ambush on 17 June, Admiral Howe offered a $25,000 reward for information 
leading to the warlord’s arrest, to no avail.  President Clinton stated that Aidid’s forces 
were responsible for the worst attack of UN peacekeepers in three decades, and that the 
US could not let it go unpunished.45  CIA agents were sent it to try and track him down, 
but they too failed.  A raid on a location purported to be Aidid’s headquarters on 12 July 
resulted in the deaths of 54 Somali civilians.  Following this, Aidid ordered his men to 
target and kill all Americans in Somalia, provoking General Montgomery, commander of 
the Quick Reaction Force, to request the deployment of additional special forces and 
equipment.  His request was opposed by Congress, Secretary of Defense Aspin and 
General Powell, and was as such denied.  This decision was reversed on 21 August after a 
landmine was responsible for the deaths of four US soldiers, and 400 Army Rangers and 
Delta forces were deployed as Task Force Ranger to assist UNOSOM II. 
With the arrival of the new troops, raids against Aidid’s forces and their bases 
increased in frequency.  Consequently, there were more casualties to UN troops as Aidid 
responded by similarly increasing the number of attacks.  UN forces were hard pressed to 
defend themselves or retaliate against militia gunmen using civilians for cover when 
attacking troops, bases and UN civilian facilities and humanitarian aid distribution 
centers.  Additional attacks occurred on 17 June, 28 June and 7 July during which five, 
two and three UNOSOM peacekeepers lost their lives.  The Quick Reaction Force 
                                                 
44 UNSC Resolution 837, 6 June 1993.  In The United Nations and Somalia 1992-1996.  The United 
Nations Blue Books Series, Volume VII.  New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1996, 
Document 55, p. 267. 
45 Ibid, p. 31. 
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stepped up operations and began direct bombing attacks against faction compounds, but 
the ambushes continued resulting in 21 more deaths by 3 October.  There were no attacks 
made directly against US troops, as the Somali militia focused on the Nigerian, 
Moroccan, Italian and Pakistani forces, only engaging the Americans when they arrived 
in response to an attack on their coalition allies.  Task Force Ranger did have a higher 
profile in-country than the Quick Reaction Force had because they were constantly 
conducting surveillance and patrol missions by helicopter and actively seeking out 
Aidid’s staff as well as hunting the man himself.  The next incident involving American 
casualties occurred on 25 September when a US helicopter was shot down and three crew 
members lost their lives. 
Congress responded immediately, passing a resolution asking the president to get 
congressional approval if US forces were to remain in Somalia later than 15 November.  
President Clinton did not respond immediately, and a week later on 3 October disaster 
struck.  Task Force Ranger had been sent on a mission to raid the Olympic Hotel in 
downtown Mogadishu where intelligence reported a meeting was being held between 
Aidid and his staff.  Twenty-four militia leaders were captured, but the Rangers were 
ambushed while taking the prisoners to the extraction point.  Somali militia shot down 
two US Army Black Hawk helicopters and fought the Americans and responding 
UNOSOM II units for four hours, resulting in the worst single battle casualties of the 
entire UNOSOM mission dating back to its inception in 1992.  Eighteen Americans and 
one Malaysian soldier were killed and ninety others were wounded. Chief Warrant 
Officer Michael Durant, the pilot of one of the helicopters was captured, brutalized and 
dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, in full view of the international press.  
President Clinton came under pressure from the US public to change US policy in 
Somalia, and four days after the attack, on 7 October, he announced that US troops would 
withdraw completely by 31 March 1994 after ordering them to stop the hunt for Aidid, 
which had caused the escalation leading to this point. 
As troops began planning to pull out a full year earlier than originally set forth in 
Resolution 814, it became increasingly difficult for the remaining forces to carryout their 
mission.  In February, after a review of the situation, Resolution 897 further revised the 
mandate, removing the peace-enforcement provisions of Resolution 814 and reverting 
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UNOSOM II to a peacekeeping operation where force would not be used to achieve its 
mission objectives and weapons would only be used in self-defense.46  The last US and 
European forces withdrew in March 1994, while the balance of the troops remained for 
another year.  Their presence helped to solve the acute problems in Somalia, but they 
were unable to achieve a long term solution by rebuilding the country as stated in the 
lofty expectations of UNOSOM II’s original mandate.  UN political missions, observers 
and NGO operations have continued in Somalia treating the symptoms of the problem 
and helping the populace, but the underlying political difficulties remain despite many 
nation-building attempts. 
The US made several mistakes in the Somali intervention that contributed to the 
ultimate failure of their mission.  They based the UNITAF mission on a pre-determined 
time limit rather than a more meaningful measure of effectiveness, showing that the 
mission had no real goals in terms of US national interest to drive it.  The advance notice 
of withdrawal allowed the Somali warlords to bide their time until the less credible UN 
troops were back in charge of security to resume their attacks on the humanitarian 
workers.  US decision-makers also forgot that humanitarian operations were as much 
political as military and focused on only the latter portion of the mission, allowing the 
situation to destabilize further.  When things began to get out of hand during UNOSOM 
II, the US began reacting to the militia attacks and altering their actions to become more 
police-like as they hunted for Aidid and those deemed responsible for American 
casualties.  This put their original mission even further out of mind, loosing even the 
objective of securing humanitarian supplies and delivery sites.  By focusing too closely 
on the details, the US lost its perspective on the big picture as mission creep dragged 
them further and further from having a legitimate reason for Somali intervention.  Once 
that was lost, US decision-makers needed a reason to withdraw that would seem 
legitimate to the public.  It took 3 October to shift the US focus from military retribution 
to political reconciliation.47 
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Civil War and famine 
Long-time dictator Siad Barre is exiled from Mogadishu. Conflict between the Somali 
National Movement (SNM), Aidid’s party, and other factions causes clan infighting, 
leading to famine and lawlessness throughout portions of the country. 
January 29 Interim Government Proclaimed One faction appoints Mahdi as interim president, and another backs Aidid. 
November 17 
Full scale war 
Mogadishu is divided into two zones by the major factions in the Civil War.  The 
southern part controlled by Aidid’s forces and the northern part by Mahdi’s group.  
United Nations personnel evacuate the city. 
 
January 23 
UN Security Council Resolution 733 





Warring faction leaders sign a ceasefire agreement, which includes provisions to allow a 
UN monitoring mission into Somalia to oversee arrangements for providing 
humanitarian assistance.  
March 17 
UN Security Council Resolution 746 
Urges the continuation of UN humanitarian aid in Somalia and provides for a technical 
team to be sent to Somalia to study the problem and develop a plan for a permanent 
solution. 
April 24  
 
UN Security Council Resolution 751 
Approves UN operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) to monitor the cease-fire and provide 
military escort for the UN convoys of relief supplies.   
August 12  
 
Operation Provide Relief (United Nations Operation in Somalia – UNOSOM I) 
UN humanitarian relief effort begins with an initial deployment of 50 observers and 500 
infantry troops. 
August 28 UN Security Resolution 775 Authorizes an increase in UN security personnel to 3500. 
October 28 
Actions against UNOSOM 
Aidid declares that the Pakistani UNOSOM battalion is no longer welcome in 
Mogadishu and orders the expulsion of the UNOSOM coordinator. 
November 12 
Actions against UNOSOM 
Aidid demands the withdrawal of UNOSOM troops from Mogadishu airport, and 
attacks them when they refuse to leave. 
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November 23 
Actions against UNOSOM 
Forces loyal to Mahdi blockade Mogadishu harbor and shell ships that attempt to enter 
and deliver food. 
November 25 
US proposal to the UN 
The US offers to take the lead in organizing and commanding a military operation to 
ensure the delivery of relief supplies to Somalia, with the approval of the security 
council. 
December 3 
UN Security Council Resolution 794 
Authorizes the use of all necessary means to create a secure environment for the 
delivery of humanitarian aid in Somalia, accepting the offer made by the US and asking 
other member nations to make contributions either in cash, resources or operationally. 
December 9  
 
US initiates Operation Restore Hope as UNITAF, the Unified Task Force 
US combat troops lead an international UN force to ensure the safety of humanitarian 
aid workers so the food and supplies can reach the intended recipients.  UNITAF builds 
to a peak of 37000 troops, securing the control of nine key towns and guarding ports, 
airports, and food distribution centers while escorting food conveys. 
 
January 4-15 
First Addis Ababa Conference 
Fifteen Somali factions reach an agreement to cease hostilities, demobilize and disarm, 
turning weapons over to a UN monitoring team provided by UNITAF and UNOSOM. 
March  
Cease-fire broken 
In violation of the agreement negotiated in January, Somali forces commanded by Siad 
Hersi, son-in-law of ex-dictator Siad Barre, capture the town of Kismayo after weeks of 
fighting troops loyal to Aidid. 
March 26 
UN Security Council Resolution 814 
Authorizes UNOSOM II with expanded enforcement power to ensure safety for 
humanitarian relief workers, taking over from UNITAF.  Primary mandates focus on 
disarmament and nation building. 
 
March 27  
 
Addis Ababa Accords 
The UN organized Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia, held in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia, results in a resolution among faction leaders, including Aidid, to end 
the violence.  The accords provide for disarmament under UN supervision and a two-
year transition to the formation of a new national government. 
May 4  
 
UN takeover via UNOSOM II  
UNOSOM II formally assumes responsibility for creating a secure environment in 
Somalia, supported by the Quick Reaction Force, which is under direct US command. 
June 5  
 
Massacre of Pakistani troops 
During an inspection of a Somali arms weapons storage site, 24 Pakistani soldiers are 
ambushed and massacred. Ten others went missing and 54 were wounded in a series of 
attacks against UNOSOM II personnel in Mogadishu by Aidid’s forces.  
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June 6 
UN Security Council Resolution 837 
Strongly condemns the attack and reaffirms that under Resolution 814 the Secretary 
General is allowed to take all necessary actions against those responsible, including 
arrest, detention and punishment. 
June 8  
 
Special Forces requested 
In the aftermath of the June 5 massacre, Admiral Howe first requests a counterterrorist 
hostage rescue force from Washington because they he they needed more extensive 
military capability to deal with the escalating violence. No such troops are forthcoming 
until Task Force Ranger is deployed in August.  
June 12-16  
 
Attacks on Aidid's strongholds  
US and UN troops begin attacking various targets in Mogadishu associated with Aidid, 




Admiral Howe issues an arrest warrant for General Aidid, the mastermind behind the 
ambushes on 5 June. 
July 12  
 
Abdi house attack 
In a major escalation, American Cobra helicopters attack a house in south Mogadishu 
where a group of clan leaders are meeting, destroying the building with TOW missiles 
and cannon fire killing 54 Somali civilians. Four western journalists who had gone to 
investigate are beaten to death by an angry mob.  
August 8  
 
Americans killed by land mines 
Four American military police are killed by a remote detonated land mine set off by 
Somalis. Two weeks later on 21 August, six more US soldiers are wounded in a similar 
attack.  
August 26  
 
US Special Forces arrive in Somalia 
US Army Task Force Ranger flies into Mogadishu -- 400 elite troops from Delta Force 
and the U.S. Rangers. Led by Major General William F. Garrison, their mission is to 
capture Aidid. They begin pursuing Aidid and his top lieutenants, with sporadic success.  
September 25 
Congressional resolution 
After the downing of a US helicopter killed three American soldiers, Congress passed a 
resolution asking the president to get Congressional approval if US troops were to 




Task Force Ranger's assault on the Olympic Hotel in Mogadishu, in search of Aidid, 
results in a seventeen hour bloody battle in which US casualties number 18 killed and 
84 wounded.  
October 7  
 
Clinton's response: withdraw troops 
President Clinton sends substantial combat troops as short term reinforcements, but 
declares that American troops are to be fully withdrawn from Somalia by March 31.  
Several other countries subsequently announce they will withdraw their contingents 
within the same timeframe. 
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October 9 
Cessation of Hostilities 
Aidid’s faction declares a unilateral cessation of hostilities against UNOSOM II forces, 
but other groups outside of the capital continue fighting. 
October 29 
UN Security Council Resolution 878 
Extends the UNOSOM II mandate until November 18, when it is then extended for 
another six months. 
 
February 4 
UN Security Council Resolution 897 
Approves the continuation of UNOSOM II with a reduction in forces to 22000 and sets 
an objective of completing the implementation of the 27 March 1993 Addis Ababa 
Agreement by March 1995. 
March 24 
Declaration of National Reconciliation 
Aidid and Mahdi agree to implement a cease-fire and voluntary disarmament and to 
restore peace throughout Somalia. 
March 25  
 
Remaining US forces leave Somalia 





Somalia, the only totally failed state in history, garnered international attention in 
the early 1990s when Civil War erupted forcing the UN and other NGOs to abandon 
humanitarian aid programs that had been in place since the 1970s.  Coupled with the 
worst drought in that nation’s history, famine killed hundreds of thousands before the 
media stepped in and named the situation a tragedy in 1992.  The UN responded to public 
outcry with a series of missions: UNOSOM I, UNITAF and UNOSOM II, lasting until 
March 1995, that helped to ease the humanitarian crisis but did not solve the underlying 
political problems.  The US became involved in December of 1992 with UNITAF and 
remained until May 1994.   
Beginning in June of 1993, armed resistance to UN soldiers by Somali militia 
factions increased in severity to outright ambushes and attacks.  This prompted further 
troop deployment by UN members including Task Force Ranger from the US.  The Task 
Force’s mission was to hunt for Aidid and his staff who were responsible for the attacks 
and the deaths of nearly 50 UN peacekeepers between 5 June and 3 October 1993.  The 
Black Hawk down incident occurred on 3 October, resulting in the deaths of 18 
52 
Americans and one Malaysian and the wounding of 90 others.  One American was 
captured, beaten and dragged through the streets of Mogadishu.  Four days after this 







































































IV. NEWSPAPER ARTICLES AND OPINION POLLS DURING 
THE US INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The next step in exploring the effects of media influence on US foreign policy is 
to present the data being analyzed.  This chapter presents newspaper articles and opinion 
polls covering the time of US involvement in Somalia from 1992 to 1994.  After being 
introduced, each data set is analyzed to discover trends in reporting and public opinion in 
relation to the events described above in Table 3.1. 
 
B. NEWSPAPER ARTICLES 
The Lexis-Nexis Database, was used to search for and then create a data set 
containing newspaper articles about the US intervention in Somalia between 1992 and 
1994.48  A search was conducted in the General News category of the News database for 
articles about “Somalia” written between 01 January 1991 and 31 March 1995, a time 
period spanning from the beginning of the Somali Civil War to the end of the UN 
mission.  The search was then narrowed by adding the terms “Operation Restore Hope” 
and “US troops,” resulting in a list of over one thousand articles.  To make this number 
more manageable The Los Angeles Times was chosen to be the single source of 
newspaper articles for this research.  Doing this made several of the variables discussed 
in Chapter II relating to media story choice by gatekeepers irrelevant, and created a stable 
foundation on which to base a study of the changes in public opinion.  The Los Angeles 
Times was chosen as the representative paper because of its large readership, the fact that 
several other articles returned by the search engine used the LA Times as a source 
document, and because it was the newspaper with the most articles (106) listed in the 
search results.  Appendix A contains a list of the articles sorted by date with the 
following information for each: publication date, section, length, headline, byline and 
dateline.  Full text for each article can be accessed through Lexis-Nexis. 
 
                                                 
48 The Lexis-Nexis Universe can be accessed through the Dudley Knox Library website at: 
http://web.nps.navy.mil/%7Elibrary/Welcome.html, under databases. 
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1. The Los Angeles Times 
The Times is the largest metropolitan daily newspaper in the United States with 
an average daily circulation of one million, combining local and national readers.  There 
are four daily regional editions covering the Los Angeles metropolitan area, the San 
Fernando Valley, and Orange and Ventura counties.  A national edition is distributed to 
markets in Northern California, New York, Washington DC and other major cities on the 
East Coast.  Stories are contributed by 23 foreign, nine national and five California 
bureaus, giving The Times the largest editorial staff in California, and one of the largest 
in the world.  Weekday editions of the Times contain seven sections: Main News, 
California (Metro), Business, Sports, Southern California Living, Calendar and 
Classifieds.  Weekly sections include: Health, Food, World Report and Calendar 
Weekend.  The Sunday edition contains Book Review, Sunday Calendar, Comics, Los 
Angeles Times Magazine, Opinion, Real Estate, Travel and TV Times in addition to the 
standard sections.49  Section content is broken down in Table 4.1 below. 
 
Table 4.1 Section Content Descriptions for The Los Angeles Times by Edition. 
 
Edition Section Description 
A. Main News International, national, state, regional 
and local news 
B. California State and local news and features, 
editorials, letters to the editor, opinion 
and weather 
C. Business Local, national and international 
business and financial news with index 
lists for stocks, bonds, mutual funds and 
commodities 
D. Sports Sports coverage including: features, 
statistics and commentary 
E. Southern California Living Community, social and cultural events, 
lifestyles, trends, fashion, consumer and 
family issues, comics and daily 
crossword 
F. Calendar Reviews and listings for movies, radio, 
television, theater, art, music and dance 
Daily 
G. Classifieds Classified advertisements 
                                                 
49 Los Angeles Times.  http://www.latimes.com, 22 April 2002. 
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Edition Section Description 
Sunday Calendar Arts and entertainment guide with 
feature articles and interviews 
Real Estate Information on buying, selling, 
financing, renting and caring for your 
home 
Travel Vacation planning ideas and resources 
Opinion Expanded Sunday editorial section 
Book Review Reviews of the latest releases and The 
Times’ best seller lists 
Comics Full color 
LA Times Magazine Profiles of influential Southern 
Californians and local issues 
Sunday 
TV Times Customized listings 
 
2. Article Analysis 
The first article in the data set (Article 1 in Appendix A) was published on 06 
December 1992, three days after the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 794 
accepting the US offer of help to establish a safe environment for the delivery of 
humanitarian aid to Somalia.  The search did not return any articles prior to this time, 
suggesting that gatekeepers within the Los Angeles Times organization did not deem the 
situation in Somalia worthy of coverage until there was an active US interest involved.  
In this case, the interest was the deployment of troops abroad for a humanitarian mission.  
Coverage continued until April of 1994, at which time all US troops had been withdrawn 
from the area.   
Articles on the Somali situation were not evenly distributed throughout the 
timeframe of the search.  Stories were published more frequently during the following 
months: December 1992, March 1993, May 1993 and October 1993 as shown in Figure 
4.1.  Events significant to the overall mission occurred during three of these months, as 
described in Table 3.1.  December 1992 marked the beginning of US involvement with 
the UN mission in Somalia through UNITAF and Operation Restore Hope.  Articles for 
this time period covered the mission definition, Marine beach landing on 09 December, 
media presence on the beach, the positive outlook of the soldiers, Somalis welcoming the 
Americans with open arms and how quickly US forces were able to establish bases and 
begin to get humanitarian aid delivered.  US forces turned command over to UNOSOM II 
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personnel in May 1993.  That month’s stories reflected the success of the mission in 
stopping famine and the fact that Somalia served as a training ground for future 
humanitarian operations.  The Blackhawk Down incident occurred in October 1993, 
followed by President Clinton’s decision to withdraw US troops by 31 March 1994.  
Articles for this period discussed the increasingly hostile conditions in Somalia, the 
casualties to US and UN forces since June, questions about the nature of the mission, and 
the need for American troops to come home.  March 1993 also showed an increase in the 
number of articles published, but not for an event shown on the UN timeline.  The Addis 
Ababa Accords were signed at the National Reconciliation Conference, providing the 
legal backing for the UN to launch UNOSOM II, but the articles published in The Times 














Figure 4.1 Number of Articles on Somalia Published in the Los Angeles Times by Month 
 
The lack of articles during other time periods shown in Figure 4.1 reflect the lack 
of significant actions on the part of US forces in Somalia, but not the lack of important 
events on the UN timeline.  Immediately after US forces left in May 1993 and UNOSOM 
II officially took command, coverage by the LA paper stopped.  The Times did not 
publish any further articles on Somalia until the end of August when Task Force Ranger 
was deployed.  There was one feature article in the LA Times Magazine in June, but it 
was an overview of Operation Restore Hope as seen through the eyes of a Marine 
Company based out of Twentynine Palms, CA.  This was mainly a human interest piece 
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about LA “locals” seeing action; no new information was presented.  Starting on 05 June, 
one month after the US departure and continuing through the summer, Somali militia 
under the command of Aidid carried out a series of raids against UNOSOM personnel, 
killing over fifty.  Yet, no articles were published in The Times until 29 August when US 
Special Forces were deployed to assist in hunting down Aidid.  Another gap in reporting 
was broken on 26 September when an American helicopter was shot down and three US 
soldiers were killed.  Stories picked up again on 04 October with coverage of the 
Blackhawk Down incident, and a full 25% of the articles in the data set were published 
during that month.  US military activities in Somalia fell off in the aftermath of the 
incident, and so did newspaper coverage.  There was a virtual blackout in The Times 
until March 1994 when the Americans pulled out. 
These trends in the timing of coverage shows that in order for a story to be 
published, the event must have significance to the American public.  The overall situation 
in Somalia was not of national interest to the United States because US does not have any 
treaties with Somalia, economic interest in the area and does not gain any particular 
military advantage by maintaining a presence there.  Because of this, events in Somalia 
are not newsworthy to Americans unless Americans are involved.  This is clearly seen in 
the trends described above as coverage is maintained through out the initial US 
deployment for UNITAF, falls off after the initial withdrawal, spikes after the American 
casualties in October, and then all but disappears afterward.  This leads to the further 
observation that American presence does not guarantee newspaper coverage, there first 
needs to be a significant event to draw media attention.  But, no matter how significant 
the event, it will eventually become old news through audience fatigue will fade from the 
headlines.   
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Another important trend is the tone in which the articles are written, either 
positive, negative or neutral.  The tone determines the audience’s perception of the 
information being presented.  At the beginning of the US deployment to Somalia, the 
articles are mostly positive, focusing on the humanitarian nature of the mission, the 
anticipated ease at completing it, the Somali welcome of the Marines, and the quick 
success at getting food delivered.  Things begin to change after the Marines had been in-
country for about a month, long enough for the Somali militia to get used to their 
presence and adjust accordingly.  In January 1993, the militia begin acting in a hostile 
fashion and resume attacking humanitarian supplies and distribution points.  When a 
Marine is killed on 26 January, there is an immediate reaction in the press.  Articles 
appear that question US presence in Somalia, ask why taxpayers are responsible for 
funding the effort, and begin to describe Somalia as hostile territory.  Positive and 
negative stories then remain relatively balanced until UNITAF ends in May, and the 
articles become positive once again when they reflect on the success of the US mission.  
Figure 4.2 shows the distribution in tone among the 70 articles on Somalia published 
before 29 August 1993 (Articles 1 through 70 in Appendix A.)  The positive articles 








Figure 4.2 Tone of LA Times Articles on Somalia from 09 Dec 1992 to 28 Aug 1993 
 
There is a drastic change in tone beginning with the deployment of Task Force 
Ranger at the end of August 1993, after which time the remaining 36 articles in the data 
set all have a negative slant.  The first article (Article 71) published on 29 August, 
describes the situation in Somalia as getting out of hand with the US changing its mission 
drastically from humanitarian assistance to a manhunt, while the UN is being completely 
ineffective at providing a long term solution to the problem.    The remaining articles 
continue to reflect negatively on the US presence in Somalia, recounting the deaths of 
UN peacekeepers since the beginning of the summer, mission drift and continuing to 
question US presence.  The end of September brings open criticism from Congress and 
demands that the President set a withdrawal date.  Article 78 on 04 October is the first 
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after the incident, and the negativity continues from there until the final article in April.  
Not only do the articles focus on Somalia, but they also call into question President 
Clinton’s ability to do his job and future US roles in both UN and other humanitarian 
operations, namely Bosnia and Haiti.  The negative articles outweigh the positive ones, 
making the US intervention in Somalia a failure, regardless of previous feelings to the 







Figure 4.3 Tone of all LA Times Articles on Somalia from 09 Dec1992 to 01 April 1994 
 
Trends in the tone of articles can help determine what it takes to influence actions 
on the governmental level.  Policies started changing after the American deaths on 03 
October, but there had been previous American deaths that did not evoke such a response.  
The first American casualty came in January and there was an uproar of negativity from 
the press, but Operation Restore Hope carried on, continuing to succeed in its 
humanitarian endeavor.  As a result positives balanced out the negatives and no 
significant policy changes were made in the wake of the first US death in Somalia.  Four 
further casualties on 08 August helped to bring Task Force Ranger into the picture.  
Admiral Howe, the UNOSOM II commander, had been asking for Special Forces help 
against the Somali militia since the ambushes in the beginning of June, but was refused 
repeatedly and over 50 UN peacekeepers died.  None of these events made The Times, 
but the eventual deployment of the Rangers on 26 August did amid more negativity, but it 
was still not enough to galvanize Congress into action.  It would take the downing of a 
US helicopter on 26 September for Senator Nunn to criticize Clinton’s actions in Somalia 
and call for a withdrawal date to be set (Article 74.)  The President promised to consider 
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it, but did not want to act hastily.  A week later it was 03 October and too late to prevent 
a tragedy.  The press lashed out with negativity that this time would not let up, and three 
days later Clinton had redefined a limited US policy in Somalia and set a date for all 
troops to return home.   
The sequence of actions here supports the earlier observation that events will not 
be noticed unless they are significant enough to warrant the country’s undivided 
attention.  Previous American and coalition casualties were unable to do this because they 
were either not significant enough in number, could be balanced against positive mission 
accomplishments (the “it was worth it” argument), or simply did not seem newsworthy to 
media gatekeepers at the time so were not published.  The incident on 03 October made 
everyone take notice of “that mess in Somalia” as the situation was referred to in Article 
81.  The mess consisted of:  two downed helicopters, 19 dead and 90 wounded of which 
two, 18 and 78, respectively were American.  It put a negative spin on the entire Somali 
intervention, causing it to be almost constantly compared to America’s other great 
failure—Vietnam.  As soon as that happened, Clinton had to act and drew up a six month 
exit strategy for US forces to ensure that they would leave, but without completely 
destabilizing the country and destroying UN chances at working out a political solution.  
  
C. OPINION POLLS 
The Lexis-Nexis Database was used to search for and create a data set of opinion 
polls for the time period of the US intervention in Somalia from 1992 to 1994.  A search 
was conducted in the Polls and Survey section of the General Reference category within 
the database, which contains the archives of the Roper Center for Public Opinion 
Research.50  Using the time frame bracketed by the newspaper articles selected 
previously, a search was made for polls relating to “Somalia” between December 1992 
and April 1994.  The resulting 500 polls were then reviewed to discard duplicates and 
questions that did not fall into one of the following categories: mission approval, mission 
goals, pullout conditions, and whether the mission was worth it or not.  The resulting 
                                                 
50 The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research is a non-profit education and research organization 
in the field of public opinion and public policy, and has access to polling data from Gallup, Harris, Roper, 
ABC, CBS, CNN, NBC, Los Angeles Times, New York Times, USA Today and Wall Street Journal. 
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polls fall within the time period between December 1992 and December 1993.  Appendix 
B contains a list of the 76 selected polls sorted into groups and by date within each group.  
The following information is provided for each poll: question, results, organization 
conducting the survey, population polled, number of participants, interview method, 
survey sponsor, date and source document.  Demographic breakdowns for each survey 
can be accessed through Lexis-Nexis. 
 
1. The Polling Process 
The polls selected for analysis are from various sources including the Gallup 
Organization, ABC and CBS News, the Harris Poll and the New York Times.  They were 
all conducted as telephone interviews with a randomly selected group representative of 
the national adult population.  Table 4.2 shows the demographic breakdown for Poll 1 as 
conducted by the Gallup Organization, where 602 respondents were asked on 03 
December 1992 if they approved of President Bush’s plan to send US forces to aid in 
humanitarian relief in Somalia.  The Gallup poll uses a computer generated list of all 
possible household phone numbers in the US from which to randomly select a group of 
500 to 1000 to represent a cross-section of the American public.  Once the sample list is 
complete, trained interviewers use computer assisted telephone interviewing technology, 
which brings the survey questions up on a computer monitor and records the responses, 
allowing for continuous and automatic tabulation of results.  The computer prompts the 
interviewer with one of multiple formulations of the same question to minimize the 
impact of wording on survey responses.   To correct for bias based on the polling method, 
the interviewers go to extensive lengths to reach an adult respondent at the selected 
number.  If the line is busy or there is no answer, the number is repeatedly called back 
during the survey period until there is a response, ensuring that individuals are not 
dropped from the sample because they are not home or are on the phone during the initial 
call.  Interviewers also try to randomly select an individual in the house rather than 
defaulting to the person who initially answers the phone in households with more than 
one adult.51  The process used for the Gallup Poll is similar to that used by other polling 
organizations when conducting telephone surveys.  
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51 The Gallup Organization. “How polls are conducted.” http://www.gallup.com/help/FAQs/poll1.asp, 
Table 4.2 Demographic Breakdown of Respondents to Poll 1. 
 
Response (%) Population Number Approve Disapprove Do not know/ Refused 
Male 299 69 23 8 
Female 303 63 24 13 
White 535 66 22 12 
Black 32 64 31 5 
Asian 9 61 39 0 
< HS grad 56 58 26 16 
HS graduate 224 61 27 12 
Some college 160 71 20 9 
College grad 160 74 20 6 
East 125 67 26 8 
Midwest 151 65 18 17 
South 210 65 26 9 
West 116 66 25 9 
Republican 173 74 16 9 
Democrat 203 64 28 8 
Independent 198 63 26 11 
18-29 years old 115 65 27 8 
30-39 130 69 23 9 
40-49 127 75 18 7 
50-59 87 68 18 13 
60-69 66 62 23 16 
70 and over  72 49 36 14 
 
2. Poll Analysis 
The 76 sets of poll results listed in Appendix B are organized by subject grouping 
to facilitate the identification of trends in public opinion over time.  The subject groups 
chosen for analysis are: mission approval, mission goals, pullout conditions, and mission 
worth.  Figure 4.4 shows the group breakdown.  These subjects were chosen over others 
                                                 
06 May 2002. 
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such as mission length because they are issues that government decision-makers have to 













Figure 4.4 Breakdown of Opinion Polls by Analysis Grouping 
 
The first group of results (Polls 1 through 32 in Appendix B) selected for analysis 
track the change in public approval of the mission over time, with a peak approval rating 
of 81% occurring on 07 December 1992 and a low rating of 21% on 06 October 1993. 
This trend is shown in Figure 4.5.  Throughout the original UNITAF mission, public 
approval remained above 70%.  There was no significant change in approval rates after 
the January death of a Marine during a raid on the airport.  Support only began to drop 
off after the departure of UNITAF troops when the Quick Reaction Force began to act as 
a police unit tracking militia groups responsible for ambushing UN Peacekeepers during 
the summer of 1993.  Further declines in public support were recorded after the 
deployment of Task Force Ranger in late August with their assigned mission of hunting 
down Aidid.  The greatest decrease in the mission approval rating occurred in reaction to 
the events of 03 October 1993.  The public was mollified by President Clinton’s 
announcement of both a return to the humanitarian definition of the mission and the 
setting of a mission end-date in March 1994.  As long as US forces in Somalia were 
operating in accordance with the original mission definition of facilitating the delivery of 
humanitarian aid, the public remained solidly behind the conduct of the mission.  The 
moment the mission changed to peace enforcement and then a manhunt, public support 
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fell off rapidly.  Support was at 40%, half of the original level at the end of September 
1993 when Congress began publicly speaking out against continued US presence in 
Somalia and asking the President to set a firm withdrawal date.  Clinton deferred his 
decision until a week later, after 03 October.  At this point, public opinion was standing 
at 21%, half that of the previous week.  Immediately after Clinton’s announcement on 07 























Figure 4.5 Trend in Public Approval for the Mission in Somalia from Dec 1992 to Oct 
1993 
 
Looking back after the incident on 03 October 1993, the public approval of the 
original decision to launch the mission back in December of 1992 remained relatively 
constant, as shown in Table 4.3.  The negative change in opinion about the mission 
shown in Figure 4.5 is due to developments on the ground since the original deployment, 
not a change in the public mindset about whether delivering humanitarian aid to Somalia 
is the right thing to do.  Mission approval is significantly lower than it was in December 
of 1992 because after a year of operating in Somalia, the public has more information to 
consider when rating the decision in October of 1993 than they had at the beginning of 
UNITAF.  All of this information has built up during the life of the mission and is used 
by the public when processing new developments, as discussed in Chapter II.  
Consciously or unconsciously, the public weighs contributing factors and their own 
preconceived notions about Somalia, the pros and cons of humanitarian aid, the use of US 
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troops for operations other than war, and of course the casualties that have accrued.  The 
result is an overall lowering in the mission approval rating as the public weighs the 
consequences of involvement, while support remains at about 60% because of the nature 
of the mission.  Humanitarian aid is an easy mission to support when you consider the 
suffering of the victims, the relatively easy solution to hunger and the prosperity of the 
US versus that of Somalia.  Public opinion as to whether the mission was worth the cost 
(Polls 70 through 76,) shown in Figure 4.6, follows a trend similar to that of public 
opinion, probably due to these same though processes. 
 
Table 4.3 Public Approval of the Original Decision to Launch the Mission 
 
Polling date Approval Rating 
5 October 1993 56% 
6 October 1993 63% 
7 October 1993 64% 
18 October 1993 67% 
























Figure 4.6 Trend in Positive Responses to the Survey Question: Is the mission in Somalia 
worth the cost? From Dec 1992 to Dec 1993 
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Public approval of the mission goals (Polls 33 through 52) is more difficult to 
track than approval of the overall mission due to the fact that the goals were constantly 
changing throughout the US intervention.  The original stated mission objective was to 
provide security to ensure the delivery of humanitarian supplies to the people of Somalia, 
which the public was solidly behind, as described above.  Approval rates for the other 
missions that US troops conducted while in Somalia never reached the same levels.  One 
of missions included the UN nation building effort aimed at creating a stable government 
and provide a long term political solution to the inter-clan rivalries that were the root 
cause of the Civil War and famine.  President Bush stated outright that Operation Restore 
Hope would be focusing solely on the humanitarian side of the operation and making the 
country secure for aid delivery before returning command to UN forces who would then 
continue the mission of political reconciliation.  This was never a primary goal of the US 
forces in Somalia, though diplomatic efforts were made to smooth the way for UNITAF’s 
entry into the county.  Other missions developed as both UN and US forces adapted to 
operations in Somalia and the constant challenges presented by the roving militia and 
constant ambushes that followed first US exit.  During the summer, Admiral Howe 
declared a bounty on Aidid, adding his capture to the ever expanding mission task list.  
The UN Security Council exacerbated the situation by passing Resolution 837 calling for 
the arrest, detainment and punishment of those responsible for the ambushes.  Public 
approval was continuing to fall at this time, and then 03 October triggered a desire within 
the public withdrawing US troops completely. 
No mention of a withdrawal was made until polls conducted on 05 October, 
directly after the Blackhawk Down Incident, but with it came more questions, specifically 
when and how to leave.  The set of missions before US forces led to the development of a 
complex set of pullout conditions (Polls 53-69) taking into account both the timeframe of 
the pullout and what mission objectives needed to be achieved before leaving.  Sixty 
percent of the public lobbied for immediate withdrawal.  The majority did not feel that 
waiting for either the humanitarian crisis to be solved, a political solution to be reached or 
Aidid to be captured were significant enough to risk further incidents.  When asked 30% 
of respondents chose one of these options over immediate withdrawal, but when the 
question was altered, 76% wanted to wait until the US hostages had been recovered 
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before leaving.  The American public wanted all of its troops back.  President Clinton had 
to look at the bigger picture when deciding to delay withdrawal for six months.  He did 
not want to be responsible for further destabilizing the situation in Somalia, which would 
prevent the UN from completing its original mission.  He also did not want his actions to 
be dictated by Aidid, which could undermine his authority and ability to act in future 
missions such as Bosnia and Haiti. 
 
D. SUMMARY 
 Print coverage of the US intervention in Somalia was sporadic, picking up only 
when a significant event such as the original deployment of US troops and the tragedy of 
03 October 1993 occurred.  There were other important events that occurred, as shown in 
the UN timeline in Table 3.1, but most of them did not rate immediate publication in the 
Los Angeles Times because they were not of direct interest to the American public.  As 
the public followed the news coverage, opinions were altered as the audience’s attention 
was drawn to specific events, usually negative ones.  News coverage after the end of 
UNITAF was all negative in nature, focusing on the increasingly hostile environment 
soldiers were facing in Somalia and the casualties suffered by UN Peacekeepers and US 
Special Forces.  The negative slant in these stories, the public’s only source of 
information on events in Somalia influenced their opinions along the same lines, causing 
support to decline, especially after 03 October.  The fact that public opinion rebounded 
after Clinton’s announcement on 07 October suggests that it was a factor in his decision 































What are the effects of media influence on US foreign policy?  This chapter 
brings together the ideas and information presented in the previous four chapters to 
answer this question.  Additionally, this chapter provides recommendations on how 
government and military decision makers can use the media to a strategic advantage so 
that US national policy is not adversely affected by  isolated trigger events, and suggests 
areas for further research. 
 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The media shape public opinion by controlling access to information through 
gatekeeping, framing and agenda setting, which result in stories that are incomplete and 
biased.  American audiences receive these preprocessed news stories and accept them as 
fact because the source is trusted.  This is especially true when the subject of the story is 
something that the audience has no personal context for evaluating.  For example, the 
general public relies exclusively on the media for their knowledge of foreign policy and 
military operations.  Thus stories on these subjects are most likely to be accepted at face 
value and used to form opinions about events and operations as they occur. 
Media coverage of the US intervention in Somalia from December 1992 to March 
1994 and corresponding changes in public opinion show the influence the media exert.  
During the beginning of the intervention, news reports were positive and focused on the 
ease of the mission and how quickly US forces were achieving success.  At this point, 
public opinion was solidly in favor of the shot term humanitarian mission.  Changes 
began to occur after the departure of the US UNITAF troops and the UN Peacekeepers 
began to encounter increased resistance from the Somali militia.  As the operation moved 
away from humanitarian relief and into a more military mode, media reporting changed 
as well.  It began to focus on what was going wrong in Somalia, the ambushes on US and 
UN troops and the casualties that each suffered.  American audiences responded to the 
negativity of these reports by beginning to think less highly of the mission.  Public 
approval dropped to an all time low after the deaths of 18 US Army Rangers on 03 
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October 1993.  Continued negativity from the press and demands for US troops to return 
home resulted in President Clinton’s announcement on 07 October of a return to 
humanitarian operations and the setting of a withdrawal date.  Almost immediately public 
opinion rebounded, not to previous levels, but there was a definite improvement.  Media 
attention to the famine in Somalia drove public opinion to get the UN and later the US 
involved and then un-involved rather quickly when things got ugly. 
The Blackhawk Down incident was the trigger incident that caused US policy in 
Somalia to change virtually overnight.  The mission had been losing public support since 
mid-summer 1993 when the focus shifted from humanitarian aid to a more military type 
of operation, but there was no overwhelming reason to call the troops home.  Somalia 
was simply not drawing enough attention back home because the public was focused on 
other stories like Bosnia and the American economy.  These subjects were receiving 
more media attention that Somalia because they were more immediate and more 
interesting; Somalia had stopped being the top story when the bulk of the UNITAF troops 
returned home in May 1993.  Because of this, there was not enough current information 
on the mission in Somalia for the public to change its opinion in a drastic way.  The 
events of 03 October 1993 were shocking enough to grab the attention first of the press 
and then the public.  The negatively framed articles that resulted provided the “proof” 
needed by the public that the mission was a failure and it was time for the troops to come 
home.  Without a significant event to trigger a change in policy, the US would most 
likely have become bogged down in Somalia, unable to justify pulling out with the 
mission still incomplete. 
 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Media attention is like a double edged sword, it can both help and hinder an 
ongoing operation if decision makers do not take reporters seriously and learn how to 
deal with them in the proper manner.  Ideally, you want the media on your side, telling 
your story the way you want, to whom you want, when you want.  If reporters are treated 
with respect and allowed access to the information a unit commander can provide, they 
are less likely to seek out their own stories, which could possibly be damaging to the 
mission or public support.  Left to their own devices, reporters will look for an angle that 
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will grab audience attention and sell papers, without concern for the effects negative 
stories will have in the long run.  If the media is given free reign to report suspicions or 
unflattering stories to the public, they can end up influencing or even dictating military 
and government policy actions, when those actions may not be in the best interests of the 
component commander or the United States as a whole.   
Cooperation with the media on the part of the Officer in Charge of the operation 
will help greatly in accomplishing this.  Arranging press conferences, cultivating positive 
relationships with news professionals and granting interviews to journalists upon request 
can all help to gain trust and get the media on your side.  Public Affairs Officers are 
trained to deal with the media and function well in this role, but there is no guarantee that 
a PAO will always be available when such a situation arises.  Consequently, media 
studies and public relations training need to be a part of the basic officer training courses 
for all branches of the United States Military.  Knowing what to say and how to say it is 
instrumental in determining the way the media frame the story, and how the public see it.  
With formalized training, military officers will be better prepared to deal with media 
presence in any situation and will help the operation by preprocessing information for the 
media and thus exerting some control over the message that gets out to the general public. 
In addition to working with the media during an operation to ensure stories reflect 
official positions and policies, government and military decision makers must engage in 
better preparation of the public before an operation begins.  Public opinion during the US 
intervention in Somalia took a downward turn when the mission changed from one of 
humanitarian relief to a police action rounding up roving bands of militia and finally a 
manhunt.  This was due to the fact that Operation Restore Hope was originally conceived 
and publicized as a short term emergency relief mission.  The public received this 
message and accepted it, believing that US troops would deliver some supplies and return 
home in a few months.  When those few months passed and US s Special Forces were 
still in-country and engaged in gun battles and ambushes, the public responded by 
becoming less supportive of the effort.  If the public had been properly prepared for the 
eventual character of the mission at the outset, public opinion would have been more 
likely to have remained in favor of the intervention, allowing US troops to complete their 
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mission successfully rather than being pulled out in response to the Blackhawk Down 
incident on 03 October 1993. 
 
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
In preparation for training officials to deal more effectively with the media, 
research can be focused on developing lesson plans for courses in media studies and 
influence for government officials and for military officers.  Additionally, a closer study 
of television news coverage and a review of media on the Internet would help to create a 
more complete picture of media influences on the public in the 21st Century.  
Technological advances in all areas allow the public more immediate access to news and 
information, adding a new dimension to the question of media influence. 
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APPENDIX A – NEWSPAPER ARTICLES SELECTED 
All articles are from the Los Angeles times and were accessed through the Lexis-Nexis 
database on-line at the following address: http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe.  The 
following list is in ascending order by date. 
 
Article 1.  DATE: December 6, 1992, Sunday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 19; Column 1; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 865 words  
HEADLINE: RELIEF WORKERS LOOK TO SOMALIA'S FUTURE;  
MISSION: AID AGENCIES HOPE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
WILL HELP REBUILD NATION.  
BYLINE: By EDWIN CHEN, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: WASHINGTON 
 
Article 2.  DATE: December 7, 1992, Monday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 5; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 875 words  
HEADLINE: AID CONVOY ENDS SOMALIA STANDOFF;  
RELIEF: TRUCKS LADEN WITH FOOD ARE THE FIRST TO MAKE 
IT OUT OF THE CAPITAL'S PORT IN A MONTH. MILITIAS THAT 
HAD BARRED THE WAY CAPITULATE AS MARINES MASS 
OFFSHORE.  
BYLINE: By SCOTT PETERSON, SPECIAL TO THE TIMES  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia 
 
Article 3.  DATE: December 9, 1992, Wednesday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 5; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 2569 words  
HEADLINE: MARINES GO ASHORE IN SOMALIA;  
TROOPS UNOPPOSED IN MISSION TO AID STARVING;  
FAMINE: FORCES SECURE THE AIRFIELD AND PORT IN THE 
CAPITAL OF MOGADISHU. TV CREWS WAIT FOR ARRIVAL AND 
LIGHT UP MARINES. SOME SOMALIS APPEAR TO SURRENDER 
AND ARE TURNED OVER TO U.N. PEACEKEEPERS.  
BYLINE: By MARK FINEMAN and SCOTT KRAFT, TIMES STAFF 
WRITERS  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia  
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Article 4.  DATE: December 10, 1992, Thursday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 13; Column 1; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 865 words  
HEADLINE: TV'S BRIGHT LIGHTS TURN OFF PENTAGON 
CHIEFS;  
MEDIA: BROADCASTERS AND MILITARY LEADERS TRADE 
ANGRY WORDS OVER SPECTACLE AS TROOPS HIT BEACH.  
BYLINE: By ART PINE, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: WASHINGTON  
 
Article 5.  DATE: December 10, 1992, Thursday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 12; Column 2; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 728 words  
HEADLINE: READY FOR WORST -- BUT IT'S NOT BEIRUT;  
RECEPTION: 'THEY'RE SO FRIENDLY,' PENDLETON MARINE 
SAYS OF WARM WELCOME FROM SOMALIS IN THE CAPITAL.  
BYLINE: By SCOTT KRAFT, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia 
 
Article 6.  DATE: December 10, 1992, Thursday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 6; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 1923 words  
HEADLINE: MARINES REOPEN AIRPORT TO AID; SOMALIS 
CHEER 1ST RELIEF FLIGHT;  
FAMINE: PATROLS RETAKE LOOTED U.S. EMBASSY AND STAGE 
SHOW OF FORCE TO DETER ANY OPPOSITION. THOUSANDS 
POUR INTO STREETS FREED OF GUNS.  
BYLINE: By SCOTT KRAFT and MARK FINEMAN, TIMES STAFF 
WRITERS  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia  
 
Article 7.  DATE: December 10, 1992, Thursday, San Diego County Edition  
SECTION: Metro; Part B; Page 1; Column 5; Metro Desk  
LENGTH: 680 words  
HEADLINE: MARINES LEAVE TO KEEP SOMALIAN MISSION 
SUPPLIED;  
LOGISTICS: HUMANITARIAN NATURE OF OPERATION HELPS 
TROOPS AND FAMILIES DEAL WITH THE DEPLOYMENT 
FAREWELLS.  




Article 8.  DATE: December 12, 1992, Saturday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 15; Column 1; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 977 words  
HEADLINE: U.N. CHIEF WANTS U.S. TO DISARM SOMALIS;  
GOALS: HE SAYS OFFICIALS RAISED NO OBJECTION TO HIS 
REQUEST THAT MISSION GO BEYOND FAMINE RELIEF.  
BYLINE: By STANLEY MEISLER and NORMAN KEMPSTER, TIMES 
STAFF WRITERS  
DATELINE: UNITED NATIONS  
 
Article 9.  DATE: December 12, 1992, Saturday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 12; Column 1; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 649 words  
HEADLINE: GUNPLAY MAY BE ENDING ON GREEN LINE;  
SOMALIA: A SYMBOL OF BANDITRY DIVIDING THE CAPITAL IS 
ERASED BY A PACT BETWEEN WARRING CLANS.  
BYLINE: By SCOTT KRAFT, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia  
 
Article 10.  DATE: December 12, 1992, Saturday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 2; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 1146 words  
HEADLINE: MOGADISHU'S WARLORDS ANNOUNCE PEACE 
PACT;  
ACCORD: SOMALI CLANS AGREE TO PUT AN IMMEDIATE END 
TO FIGHTING IN THE CAPITAL. BUT VIOLENCE INLAND 
CONTINUES.  
BYLINE: By MARK FINEMAN and SCOTT KRAFT, TIMES STAFF 
WRITERS  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia  
 
Article 11.  DATE: December 14, 1992, Monday, Home Edition   
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 6; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 1284 words  
HEADLINE: U.S. TROOPS MOVE INLAND IN SOMALIA;  
RELIEF: TAKEOVER OF DESERTED AIRSTRIP MARKS FIRST 
MAJOR FORAY INTO COUNTRY'S CENTRAL REGION. HELP IS 
ONE STEP CLOSER TO AID WORKERS IN BAIDOA.  
BYLINE: By SCOTT KRAFT, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: BELA DOGLE, Somalia 
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Article 12.  DATE: December 15, 1992, Tuesday, Home Edition  
SECTION: World Report; Page 5; World Report  
LENGTH: 917 words  
HEADLINE: DOCUMENTARY;  
STORMING THE BEACH -- AND MEETING THE PRESS;  
THE MARINES' FIRST ENGAGEMENT IN SOMALIA WAS WITH 
THE MEDIA. FORTUNATELY, THE ONLY CASUALTIES WERE 
DIGNITY, DECORUM AND NERVES.  
BYLINE: By MARK FINEMAN, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia 
 
Article 13.  DATE: December 15, 1992, Tuesday, Home Edition   
SECTION: Part A; Page 18; Column 1; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 1046 words  
HEADLINE: AMID QUESTIONS ABOUT DELAY, TROOPS 
PREPARE TO FAN OUT FROM SOMALI CAPITAL;  
RELIEF: DEBATE OVER PRECISE ROLE OF U.S.-LED OPERATION 
SPARKS RENEWED ANXIETY ON MOGADISHU'S STREETS.  
BYLINE: By MARK FINEMAN, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia 
 
Article 14.  DATE: December 16, 1992, Wednesday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 6; Column 2; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 1037 words  
HEADLINE: STARVING SOMALIS TOO WEAK TO TEND CROPS 
AS HARVEST NEARS;  
FAMINE: TROOPS' ARRIVAL MAY BE TOO LATE FOR REMOTE 
REGIONS PILLAGED BY ARMED BANDS, ISOLATED BY LAND 
MINES.  
BYLINE: By MARK FINEMAN, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia 
 
Article 15.  DATE: December 16, 1992, Wednesday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 5; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 1623 words  
HEADLINE: U.S.-LED CONVOY REACHES BAIDOA, CENTER OF 
FAMINE;  
SOMALIA: THE HEAVILY ARMED TROOPS MEET LITTLE 
RESISTANCE AS THEY ENTER THE CITY, WHERE 60 PEOPLE 
HAVE BEEN DYING EACH DAY AMID ATTACKS ON RELIEF 
OFFICIALS.  
BYLINE: By SCOTT KRAFT and MARK FINEMAN, TIMES STAFF 
WRITERS  
DATELINE: BAIDOA, Somalia 
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Article 16.  DATE: December 17, 1992, Thursday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 6; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 1107 words  
HEADLINE: TROOPS CARRY PRECIOUS GIFT: PEACE OF MIND  
BYLINE: By SCOTT KRAFT, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: BAIDOA, Somalia  
 
Article 17.  DATE: December 17, 1992, Thursday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 5; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 1126 words  
HEADLINE: SOMALI PERIL NOT OVER, U.S. SAYS;  
FAMINE: TROOPS SECURE BAIDOA, BUT SPECIAL ENVOY 
OAKLEY CITES AREAS THAT ARE EVEN MORE TENSE. U.N. 
TRUCKS WILL COMPETE WITH COSTLY LOCAL SHIPPING 
CARTEL.  
BYLINE: By MARK FINEMAN and SCOTT KRAFT, TIMES STAFF 
WRITERS  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia  
 
Article 18.  DATE: December 18, 1992, Friday, Home Edition   
SECTION: Part A; Page 4; Column 1; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 1079 words  
HEADLINE: FOOD CONVOYS REACHING REMOTE HUNGER 
ZONES;  
SOMALIA: OPERATION RESTORE HOPE IS DAYS AHEAD OF 
SCHEDULE, U.S. OFFICERS SAY.  
BYLINE: By SCOTT KRAFT, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia  
 
Article 19.  DATE: December 18, 1992, Friday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 4; Column 1; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 809 words  
HEADLINE: SOMALIA CAN BE SCARIER THAN IRAQI SCUDS, 
SOME GULF VETS SAY  
BYLINE: By RAY TESSLER, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia  
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Article 20.  DATE: December 19, 1992, Saturday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 16; Column 1; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 1445 words  
HEADLINE: U.S., FOREIGN FORCES BACK EACH OTHER UP;  
SOMALIA: THE LARGE NUMBER OF COUNTRIES 
VOLUNTEERING TO SEND FORCES HAS TAKEN AMERICAN 
COMMANDERS BY SURPRISE.  
BYLINE: By SCOTT KRAFT and MARK FINEMAN, TIMES STAFF 
WRITERS  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia  
 
Article 21.  DATE: December 19, 1992, Saturday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 5; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 1108 words  
HEADLINE: SOME GIS MAY EXIT SOMALIA IN JANUARY;  
FAMINE: WITH OPERATION GOING SMOOTHLY AND FOREIGN 
TROOPS FLOCKING IN, U.S. COMMANDER SAYS COMBAT UNITS 
MAY GO HOME EARLY, BE REPLACED BY SUPPORT 
PERSONNEL.  
BYLINE: By SCOTT KRAFT, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia  
 
Article 22.  DATE: December 21, 1992, Monday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 5; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 1142 words  
HEADLINE: WARLORD GETS WARNING AS MARINES ARRIVE  
BYLINE: By KENNETH FREED, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: KISMAYU, Somalia  
 
Article 23.  DATE: December 22, 1992, Tuesday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 5; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 1390 words  
HEADLINE: SOMALI WARLORDS AGREE TO ARMS CUT;  
SECURITY: DOZENS OF GUN-BEARING VEHICLES ARE TO BE 
TAKEN OFF THE CAPITAL'S STREETS. IF THE THREAT TO 
MARINES IS NOT REMOVED, THE VEHICLES WILL BE 
DESTROYED.  
BYLINE: By KENNETH FREED, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia 
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Article 24.  DATE: December 23, 1992, Wednesday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 3; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 1153 words  
HEADLINE: SOMALIA EFFORT AHEAD OF GOALS; BUSH WILL 
VISIT  
BYLINE: By KENNETH FREED, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia  
 
Article 25.  DATE: December 24, 1992, Thursday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 8; Column 1; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 728 words  
HEADLINE: NEWS ANALYSIS;  
MARINES' NEW SLOGAN: 'THE FIRST TO HELP OUT';  
MILITARY: HUMANITARIAN MISSION IN SOMALIA HIGHLIGHTS 
THE SHIFT AWAY FROM TRADITIONAL ROLE AS THE 'FIRST TO 
FIGHT.'  
BYLINE: By H. G. REZA, TIMES STAFF WRITER 
 
Article 26.  DATE: December 24, 1992, Thursday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 2; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 810 words  
HEADLINE: AMERICAN KILLED, 3 HURT BY SOMALIA LAND 
MINE;  
FAMINE: THE FOUR CIVILIANS RIDING IN A CAR WERE AN 
ADVANCE TEAM FOR FRIDAY'S MARINE THRUST INTO 
BARDERA.  
BYLINE: By KENNETH FREED, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia  
 
Article 27.  DATE: December 25, 1992, Friday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 10; Column 2; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 1267 words  
HEADLINE: U.S. INSISTS ON CONTROL OF ITS TROOPS  
BYLINE: By ART PINE, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: WASHINGTON 
 
Article 28.  DATE: December 29, 1992, Tuesday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 6; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 929 words  
HEADLINE: SOMALI CIVIL WAR IS OVER, RIVALS VOW;  
PEACE: CLAN LEADERS EMBRACE IN PUBLIC AND THOUSANDS 
CHEER. BUT VIOLENCE CONTINUES, AND CLASHES WITH U.S. 
TROOPS RESULT IN AT LEAST ONE SOMALI DEATH.  
BYLINE: By KENNETH FREED, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia  
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Article 29.  DATE: December 30, 1992, Wednesday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 10; Column 1; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 470 words  
HEADLINE: MARINES GETTING TOUGH IN SOMALI CAPITAL AS 
BUSH VISIT IS AWAITED  
BYLINE: From Associated Press  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia  
 
Article 30.  DATE: January 1, 1993, Friday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 5; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 1344 words  
HEADLINE: BUSH HAILS TROOPS FOR AIDING SOMALIS;  
AFRICA: PRESIDENT VISITS FORCES, CLINIC, IS GREETED BY 
MOGADISHU-AREA RESIDENTS. BUT A NIGHTTIME ARTILLERY 
DUEL BETWEEN CLANS UNDERSCORES ISSUE OF DISARMING 
MILITIAS.  
BYLINE: By DANIEL WILLIAMS, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia 
 
Article 31.  DATE: January 2, 1993, Saturday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 20; Column 2; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 527 words  
HEADLINE: BUSH TELLS TROOPS, 'WE ARE VERY, VERY 
GRATEFUL TO YOU'  
BYLINE: From Associated Press  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia  
 
Article 32.  DATE: January 2, 1993, Saturday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 6; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 1442 words  
HEADLINE: BATTLES RAGE AS BUSH ENDS SOMALI TRIP;  
AFRICA: WHILE PRESIDENT VISITS ORPHANAGE AND PRAISES 
TROOPS' MERCY MISSION, FIGHTING FLARES IN RAVAGED 
COUNTRY. THE CLAN WARFARE LEAVES 17 SOMALIS DEAD ON 
ONE SIDE ALONE.  
BYLINE: By DANIEL WILLIAMS, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia  
 
Article 33.  DATE: January 5, 1993, Tuesday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 9; Column 1; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 754 words  
HEADLINE: SOMALI HOSTILITY AIMED AT U.S. TROOPS 
RANDOM BUT BECOMING COMMONPLACE  
BYLINE: By DANIEL WILLIAMS, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia  
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Article 34.  DATE: January 7, 1993, Thursday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 9; Column 3; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 201 words  
HEADLINE: U.S. HELICOPTERS ATTACK SITE HELD BY SOMALI 
WARLORD  
BYLINE: From Times Wire Services  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia  
 
Article 35.  DATE: January 7, 1993, Thursday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 2; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 796 words  
HEADLINE: MOST U.S. FORCES TO END SOMALIA DUTY BY 
MARCH 1  
BYLINE: By ROBIN WRIGHT, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: WASHINGTON  
 
Article 36.  DATE: January 9, 1993, Saturday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 8; Column 1; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 799 words  
HEADLINE: U.S. TROOPS SIGNAL INTENT TO TAKE GUNS FROM 
SOMALIS;  
AFRICA: RAID ON MOGADISHU ARMS MARKET REFLECTS 
SHIFTING ROLE. FACTION LEADERS AGREE ON MARCH PEACE 
CONFERENCE.  
BYLINE: By DANIEL WILLIAMS, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia  
 
Article 37.  DATE: January 9, 1993, Saturday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 6; Column 1; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 1458 words  
HEADLINE: IN CHAOTIC KISMAYU, U.S. ASPIRATIONS COME 
FACE TO FACE WITH REALITY;  
SOMALIA: THE EFFORT TO CREATE A STABLE ENVIRONMENT 
OUT OF A VOLATILE SITUATION HAS MET WITH ONLY 
PARTIAL SUCCESS.  
BYLINE: By DANIEL WILLIAMS, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: KISMAYU, Somalia  
 
Article 38.  DATE: January 13, 1993, Wednesday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 6; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 681 words  
HEADLINE: MARINES SUFFER 1ST FATALITY ON SOMALIA 
MISSION  
BYLINE: By MELISSA HEALY, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: WASHINGTON  
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Article 39.  DATE: January 14, 1993, Thursday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 4; Column 1; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 971 words  
HEADLINE: MARINE'S KILLING LEAVES COMRADES ANGRY, 
WORRIED  
BYLINE: By SCOTT KRAFT, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia 
 
Article 40.  DATE: January 16, 1993, Saturday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 10; Column 1; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 1334 words  
HEADLINE: SOMALIA MOSTLY STABLE, GENERAL SAYS;  
RELIEF: U.S. COMMANDER SAYS MOST OF FAMINE ZONE IS 
UNDER CONTROL AND READY TO BE TURNED OVER TO U.N.  
BYLINE: By SCOTT KRAFT, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia  
 
Article 41.  DATE: January 17, 1993, Sunday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 4; Column 1; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 684 words  
HEADLINE: U.S. SOLDIERS SURPRISE ROBBERS, KILL 6 
SOMALIS;  
AFRICA: THREE OF DEAD ARE KNOWN TO BE VICTIMS OF 
ROBBERY, MARKING AT LEAST SECOND TIME AMERICAN 
FORCES HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED KILLING UNARMED 
CIVILIANS.  
BYLINE: By SCOTT KRAFT, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia  
 
Article 42.  DATE: January 18, 1993, Monday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 13; Column 1; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 791 words  
HEADLINE: MARINE CONTINGENT TO LEAVE SOMALIA THIS 
WEEK  
BYLINE: By SCOTT KRAFT, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia 
 
84 
Article 43.  DATE: January 19, 1993, Tuesday, Home Edition  
SECTION: World Report; Page 1; Column 2; World Report  
LENGTH: 1441 words  
HEADLINE: NATIONAL AGENDA;  
SUSPICIOUS OF U.N., SOMALIS DESPAIR OVER REBUILDING;  
MANY DREAD THE DEPARTURE OF THE U.S. MILITARY 
COMMAND, WHICH THEY SEE AS KEY TO CONTAINING CHAOS.  
BYLINE: By SCOTT KRAFT, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia 
 
Article 44.  DATE: January 20, 1993, Wednesday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 3; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 1004 words  
HEADLINE: PULLOUT OF U.S. TROOPS FROM SOMALIA BEGINS 
BYLINE: By SCOTT KRAFT, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia 
 
Article 45.  DATE: January 21, 1993, Thursday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 4; Column 3; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 255 words  
HEADLINE: MARINE WOUNDED IN SOMALIA; HUNDREDS OF 
U.S. TROOPS LEAVE  
BYLINE: From Associated Press  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia 
 
Article 46.  DATE: January 22, 1993, Friday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 15; Column 1; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 481 words  
HEADLINE: DELAY POSSIBLE IN U.S. PULLOUT FROM 
SOMALIA;  
AFRICA: NO TIMETABLE CAN BE SET UNTIL THE SECURITY 
COUNCIL TRANSFERS CONTROL OF THE U.S.-LED OPERATION 
TO A U.N. PEACEKEEPING FORCE.  
BYLINE: From Associated Press  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia 
 
85 
Article 47.  DATE: January 26, 1993, Tuesday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 4; Column 4; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 779 words  
HEADLINE: U.S. FORCES DESTROY ARMS, VEHICLES OF 
SOMALI WARLORD;  
AFRICA: AMERICANS SAY THEY INTERVENED JUST TO 
ENFORCE CEASE-FIRE. RED CROSS OFFICE IS SHELLED IN 
KISMAYU.  
BYLINE: By JOHN-THOR DAHLBURG, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia 
 
Article 48.  DATE: January 26, 1993, Tuesday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 4; Column 6; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 69 words  
HEADLINE: MARINE KILLED ON PATROL IN SOMALIA  
BYLINE: By Associated Press  
DATELINE: WASHINGTON 
 
Article 49.  DATE: January 29, 1993, Friday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 5; Column 1; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 850 words  
HEADLINE: MILITARY;  
HEAVY DUTY IN SOMALIA: FEEDING HUNGRY TROOPS;  
THE RANGE OF U.S.-PROVIDED GOODS AND SERVICES FOR THE 
MULTINATIONAL FORCE SEEMS ENDLESS.  
BYLINE: By JOHN-THOR DAHLBURG, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia 
 
Article 50.  DATE: February 6, 1993, Saturday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 14; Column 1; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 727 words  
HEADLINE: SOMALIS HURL ROCKS AT U.S. TROOPS;  
AFRICA: THE CROWD MISTAKENLY THOUGHT MARINES HAD 
SHOT 6 CITIZENS IN CAPITAL. INCIDENT UNDERSCORES 
TENSIONS.  
BYLINE: By JOHN-THOR DAHLBURG, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia 
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Article 51.  DATE: February 7, 1993, Sunday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 4; Column 2; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 561 words  
HEADLINE: SOMALI FACTIONS BATTLE IN MOGADISHU;  
AFRICA: MARINES POSITION THEMSELVES IN MIDDLE OF 
RIVAL CLANS TO DEFUSE CONFLICT BUT SUFFER NO 
CASUALTIES.  
BYLINE: From Times Wire Services  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia 
 
Article 52.  DATE: February 14, 1993, Sunday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 4; Column 1; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 275 words  
HEADLINE: COMMAND IN SOMALIA MAY PASS TO U.N. WITHIN 
WEEKS  
BYLINE: From Associated Press  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia 
 
Article 53.  DATE: February 24, 1993, Wednesday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 4; Column 4; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 314 words  
HEADLINE: WARLORD GETS WARNING: LEAVE SOMALIA PORT  
BYLINE: From Associated Press  
DATELINE: KISMAYU, Somalia 
 
Article 54.  DATE: February 25, 1993, Thursday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 1; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 716 words  
HEADLINE: RAMPAGING SOMALI YOUTHS ATTACK 
COALITION TROOPS;  
AFRICA: TWO EMBASSIES IN MOGADISHU ARE ASSAULTED IN 
THE WORST UNREST SINCE DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. FORCES.  
BYLINE: From Times Wire Services  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia 
 
Article 55.  DATE: February 26, 1993, Friday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 3; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 531 words  
HEADLINE: 3 MARINES HURT IN CLASH WITH SOMALI SNIPERS  
BYLINE: From Associated Press  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia 
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Article 56.  DATE: February 28, 1993, Sunday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 2; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 1284 words  
HEADLINE: STREET BATTLES LEAVE SOMALIS, AID WORKERS 
SHAKEN, TENSE  
BYLINE: By MARK FINEMAN, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia 
 
Article 57.  DATE: March 1, 1993, Monday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 4; Column 2; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 1657 words  
HEADLINE: IN SOMALIA, MARINES FEEL THE LOSS OF A 
WELCOME MAT;  
MERCY MISSION: IN WAKE OF ANTI-AMERICAN RIOTING, 
WEARY U.S. TROOPS SAY IT'S TIME TO GO HOME.  
BYLINE: By MARK FINEMAN, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia 
 
Article 58.  DATE: March 3, 1993, Wednesday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 4; Column 1; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 983 words  
HEADLINE: U.S. ENVOY SEES SUCCESS IN TOP GOAL IN 
SOMALIA;  
AFRICA: MASS DEATHS FROM FAMINE AND DISEASE HAVE 
ENDED, OAKLEY TELLS TROOPS AS HE ENDS HIS 3-MONTH 
TOUR.  
BYLINE: By MARK FINEMAN, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia 
 
Article 59.  DATE: March 5, 1993, Friday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 13; Column 3; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 539 words  
HEADLINE: U.N. CHIEF FAULTS SECURITY IN SOMALIA;  
AFRICA: BOUTROS-GHALI PROPOSES FIELDING A FORCE OF 
28,000 TO TAKE OVER FROM U.S.-LED TROOPS.  
BYLINE: By STANLEY MEISLER, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: UNITED NATIONS 
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Article 60.  DATE: March 5, 1993, Friday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 12; Column 1; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 1256 words  
HEADLINE: USE OF FORCE AT ISSUE IN A LAND OF ANARCHY;  
SOMALIA: THE OUTCOME COULD AFFECT MARINE'S CAREER 
AND SET PRECEDENTS FOR U.S. TROOPS.  
BYLINE: By MARK FINEMAN, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia 
 
Article 61.  DATE: March 6, 1993, Saturday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 5; Column 1; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 1101 words  
HEADLINE: MARINE OFFERS CHILLING TESTIMONY IN 
SHOOTING OF SOMALI;  
AFRICA: CAMP PENDLETON RADAR TECHNICIAN SAYS HE 
FIRED IN SELF-DEFENSE. CASE IS SEEN AS A TEST OF THE 
SOMETIMES PUZZLING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT IN SOMALIA.  
BYLINE: By MARK FINEMAN, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia 
 
Article 62.  DATE: March 9, 1993, Tuesday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Metro; Part B; Page 7; Column 1; Metro Desk  
LENGTH: 786 words  
HEADLINE: COLUMN LEFT/ ALEXANDER COCKBURN;  
BAD IDEA FROM THE START;  
IN TERMS OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL STABILIZATION FOR 
SOMALIA, 'RESTORE HOPE' HAS FAILED.  
BYLINE: By ALEXANDER COCKBURN, Alexander Cockburn writes 
for the Nation and other publications. 
 
Article 63.  DATE: March 26, 1993, Friday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 27; Column 2; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 315 words  
HEADLINE: U.S. SENDS MARINES TO KISMAYU IN NEW EFFORT 
TO CURB WARLORDS  




Article 64.  DATE: March 27, 1993, Saturday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 10; Column 1; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 580 words  
HEADLINE: U.N. APPROVES LARGE FORCE FOR SOMALIA;  
PEACEKEEPING: IT WILL TAKE OVER FROM U.S.-LED TROOPS 
MAY 1 AND SEEK TO DISARM FACTIONS, HELP REBUILD 
RAVAGED NATION.  
BYLINE: From Associated Press  
DATELINE: UNITED NATIONS 
 
Article 65.  DATE: April 9, 1993, Friday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Metro; Part B; Page 6; Column 1; Metro Desk  
LENGTH: 529 words  
HEADLINE: U.S. PREPARES TO PASS THE TORCH IN SOMALIA;  
AFTER A GENERALLY SUCCESSFUL RELIEF EFFORT, U.N. WILL 
TAKE OVER 
 
Article 66.  DATE: April 29, 1993, Thursday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 5; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 918 words  
HEADLINE: U.S. TROOPS HAND OFF LAST SOMALI AREA TO 
U.N. FORCES  
BYLINE: By MARK FINEMAN, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: MARKA, Somalia 
 
Article 67.  DATE: May 5, 1993, Wednesday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 6; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 1638 words  
HEADLINE: SOMALIA ROLE ASSESSED AS U.S. FLAG IS 
LOWERED  
BYLINE: By MARK FINEMAN, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia 
 
Article 68.  DATE: May 5, 1993, Wednesday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Metro; Part B; Page 6; Column 1; Metro Desk  
LENGTH: 429 words  
HEADLINE: HUMANITARIANISM REDEFINED;  
SOMALIA: BETTER BECAUSE OF THE U.S. 
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Article 69.  DATE: May 6, 1993, Thursday, Orange County Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 2; Metro Desk  
LENGTH: 1143 words  
HEADLINE: MARINES BACK FROM SOMALIA;  
HOMECOMING: HEAD OF U.S.-LED FORCE AND STAFF RETURN 
TO EL TORO WITH SATISFACTION OF SUCCESSFUL MISSION OF 
MERCY.  
BYLINE: By KEVIN JOHNSON and OTTO STRONG, TIMES STAFF 
WRITERS  
DATELINE: EL TORO MARINE BASE 
 
Article 70.  DATE: June 27, 1993, Sunday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Magazine; Page 20; Magazine Desk  
LENGTH: 4310 words  
HEADLINE: SOLDIERS OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER;  
AGGRESSIVE PEACEMAKERS, U.S. MARINES DRAW DOWN THE 
WARLORDS OF SOMALIA AND WRITE A MILITARY BLUEPRINT 
FOR FUTURE CAMPAIGNS  
BYLINE: By MARK FINEMAN, Mark Fineman, The Times Nicosia 
bureau chief, covers the Middle East. His last article for this magazine was 
The Wrath of Rama. 
 
Article 71.  DATE: August 29, 1993, Sunday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Opinion; Part M; Page 2; Column 1; Opinion Desk  
LENGTH: 1346 words  
HEADLINE: AN ADVENTURE WITH ALL THE EARMARKS OF 
DOOM;  
SOMALIA: DISPATCHING ELITE TROOPS WILL LOCK IN THE 
MISSION'S BIG-POWER PROFILE, MAKING A SOLUTION MORE 
ELUSIVE. FOUR WAYS TO WITHDRAW GRACEFULLY.  
BYLINE: By John M. Broder and Robin Wright, John M. Broder and 
Robin Wright cover national-security affairs for The Times.  
DATELINE: WASHINGTON 
 
Article 72.  DATE: August 31, 1993, Tuesday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 4; Column 2; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 1054 words  
HEADLINE: U.N. STILL HAVING 'BAD LUCK' IN SOMALIA;  
AFRICA: OFF-TARGET COMMANDO RAID IS ONE OF A SERIES 
OF EMBARRASSMENTS AFFLICTING ALLIED MILITARY 
OPERATIONS. AND WARLORD AIDID IS STILL ON THE LOOSE.  
BYLINE: By MARK FINEMAN, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia 
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Article 73.  DATE: September 26, 1993, Sunday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 5; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 853 words  
HEADLINE: U.S. DENOUNCES ATTACK, REAFFIRMS SOMALIA 
MISSION;  
POLICY: THE ADMINISTRATION VOWS NOT TO GIVE IN TO 
'BRUTALITY OF WARLORDS' AFTER THREE AMERICANS DIE 
WHEN A HELICOPTER IS SHOT DOWN IN MOGADISHU.  
BYLINE: By MICHAEL ROSS, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: WASHINGTON 
 
Article 74.  DATE: September 27, 1993, Monday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 12; Column 2; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 373 words  
HEADLINE: NUNN CRITICIZES U.N. HUNT FOR SOMALI 
WARLORD AIDID  
BYLINE: By MICHAEL ROSS, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: WASHINGTON 
 
Article 75.  DATE: September 29, 1993, Wednesday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 5; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 975 words  
HEADLINE: CLINTON WANTS DATE SET FOR GIS TO PULL OUT 
OF SOMALIA  
BYLINE: By DOYLE McMANUS and STANLEY MEISLER, TIMES 
STAFF WRITERS  
DATELINE: WASHINGTON 
 
Article 76.  DATE: September 29, 1993, Wednesday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Metro; Part B; Page 6; Column 1; Metro Desk  
LENGTH: 454 words  
HEADLINE: SOMALIA: STAY THERE FOREVER?;  
U.N. AND AFRICAN NATIONS MUST TAKE THE LEAD 
 
Article 77.  DATE: October 4, 1993, Monday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 2; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 878 words  
HEADLINE: 5 U.S. SOLDIERS KILLED, 24 HURT IN SOMALI 
SWEEP  




Article 78.  DATE: October 5, 1993, Tuesday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 2; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 1196 words  
HEADLINE: U.S. BOOSTS SOMALIA TROOPS AFTER 12 DIE;  
AFRICA: CASUALTY FIGURES MORE THAN DOUBLE; SIX ARE 
HELD HOSTAGE. DEADLY INCIDENT THREATENS CLINTON 
POLICY.  
BYLINE: By ART PINE, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: WASHINGTON 
 
Article 79.  DATE: October 6, 1993, Wednesday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 6; Column 1; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 798 words  
HEADLINE: WARLORD AIDID'S FORCES BETTER AT FIGHTING 
NOW;  
FOES: MILITIAMEN ARE MORE ORGANIZED THAN WHEN U.N. 
TOOK OVER MISSION. THEY CAN ALSO DOWN HELICOPTERS.  
BYLINE: By ART PINE, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: WASHINGTON 
 
Article 80.  DATE: October 6, 1993, Wednesday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 5; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 961 words  
HEADLINE: ANGRY LAWMAKERS THREATEN TO PUSH FOR 
SOMALIA PULLOUT;  
AFRICA: AFTER MEETING WITH ASPIN AND CHRISTOPHER, 
MEMBERS OF BOTH PARTIES WARN THEY MAY CUT FUNDS. 
CLINTON CONFERS WITH HIS TOP SECURITY ADVISERS.  
BYLINE: By MICHAEL ROSS and ART PINE, TIMES STAFF 
WRITERS 
 
Article 81.  DATE: October 6, 1993, Wednesday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Metro; Part B; Page 6; Column 3; Metro Desk  
LENGTH: 327 words  
HEADLINE: THAT MESS IN SOMALIA 
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Article 82.  DATE: October 7, 1993, Thursday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 6; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 1989 words  
HEADLINE: CLINTON TO SEND 2,000 MORE GIS TO SOMALIA;  
AFRICA: ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL EXPECTS PULLOUT 
WITHIN SIX MONTHS. CARTER TO LEAD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DIPLOMATIC EFFORT TO END FACTIONAL FIGHTING.  




Article 83.  DATE: October 8, 1993, Friday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 12; Column 1; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 1496 words  
HEADLINE: 2 MISSIONS IN CLINTON'S APPROACH;  
FORCE: NEW DEPLOYMENT IS DESIGNED TO LAY POLITICAL 
SOLUTION BEFORE GUERRILLAS AND TO PROTECT AMERICAN 
TROOPS IN SOMALIA.  
BYLINE: By ART PINE, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: WASHINGTON 
 
Article 84.  DATE: October 8, 1993, Friday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 12; Column 1; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 468 words  
HEADLINE: POLICY APPEARS TO QUELL REVOLT IN CONGRESS  
BYLINE: By MICHAEL ROSS, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: WASHINGTON 
 
Article 85.  DATE: October 8, 1993, Friday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 6; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 1491 words  
HEADLINE: CLINTON ORDERS 5,300 TROOPS TO SOMALIA, 
SETS MARCH 31 PULLOUT;  
AFRICA: DEPLOYMENT IS 'TO PROTECT OUR TROOPS AND TO 
COMPLETE OUR MISSION,' PRESIDENT SAYS, REJECTING CALLS 
TO 'CUT AND RUN.' HE SENDS 1,700 SOLDIERS, PLUS 3,600 
MARINES TO BE STATIONED OFFSHORE.  




Article 86.  DATE: October 8, 1993, Friday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 5; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 1060 words  
HEADLINE: 'EXIT STRATEGY' FOR SOMALIA PLOWS NEW 
MILITARY GROUND;  
POLICY: SIX-MONTH DEADLINE PRAISED AS RECOGNITION OF 
LIMITED U.S. STAKE. BUT FOES COULD WAIT OUT DEPARTURE.  
BYLINE: By DOYLE McMANUS, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: WASHINGTON 
 
Article 87.  DATE: October 9, 1993, Saturday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 10; Column 1; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 1379 words  
HEADLINE: FATAL CLASHES IN SOMALIA PUT U.N. 
PEACEKEEPING ROLE IN DOUBT;  
MILITARY: ATTACK ON U.S. RANGERS CASTS CLOUD OVER 
HOPES OF MULTINATIONAL FORCES COOPERATING TO QUELL 
GLOBAL CONFLICTS.  
BYLINE: By ART PINE, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: WASHINGTON 
 
Article 88.  DATE: October 9, 1993, Saturday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 5; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 1349 words  
HEADLINE: U.S., IN SHIFT ON SOMALIA, TO PURSUE PEACE 
WITH AIDID;  
AFRICA: ADMINISTRATION ENVOY IS ASKING REGIONAL 
LEADERS FOR HELP. HUNT FOR FUGITIVE WARLORD WOULD 
BE SUSPENDED IF HE STOPPED ATTACKS. BODIES OF TWO 
MORE GIS RECOVERED.  




Article 89.  DATE: October 10, 1993, Sunday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Opinion; Part M; Page 1; Column 2; Opinion Desk  
LENGTH: 1330 words  
HEADLINE: MISSION IMPOSSIBLE;  
IS THE PRICE IN SOMALIA TOO HIGH?  
BYLINE: By CHARLES WILLIAM MAYNES, Charles William Maynes 




Article 90.  DATE: October 10, 1993, Sunday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Opinion; Part M; Page 5; Column 5; Op-Ed Desk  
LENGTH: 744 words  
HEADLINE: COLUMN RIGHT / SMITH HEMPSTONE;  
WHY WAIT SIX MONTHS? THREE WOULD DO IT;  
WHY EXPOSE U.S. TROOPS LONGER? THIS IS TRAGIC 
SIDESHOW, NOT NATIONAL SECURITY.  
BYLINE: By SMITH HEMPSTONE, Smith Hempstone, a Bush political 
appointee and former newspaper editor, was ambassador to Kenya, 1989-
93; he now teaches at the University of the South in Sewanee, Tenn. 
 
Article 91.  DATE: October 11, 1993, Monday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 6; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 954 words  
HEADLINE: U.S. SEEKS TO CLARIFY AIDID POLICY;  
SOMALIA: CLINTON ADMINISTRATION SAYS IT IS NO LONGER 
ACTIVELY SEEKING WARLORD'S ARREST BUT WOULD NOT 
RULE IT OUT. LEADING MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ARE STILL 
DISSATISFIED.  
BYLINE: By DOYLE McMANUS, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: WASHINGTON 
 
Article 92.  DATE: October 11, 1993, Monday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 5; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 1157 words  
HEADLINE: NEWS ANALYSIS;  
CLAN RIVALRIES MAY HINDER U.S. GOALS IN SOMALIA  
BYLINE: By ROBIN WRIGHT, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: WASHINGTON 
 
Article 93.  DATE: October 14, 1993, Thursday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 6; Column 1; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 1014 words  
HEADLINE: CLINTON GOES ON OFFENSIVE OVER SOMALIA 
POLICY;  
AFRICA: PRESIDENT LOBBIES LAWMAKERS ON WITHDRAWAL 
DATE. UPHILL FIGHT PREDICTED.  





Article 94.  DATE: October 15, 1993, Friday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 5; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 1460 words  
HEADLINE: CLINTON TO INSIST ON U.S. CONTROL OF GIS IN 
U.N. ROLES  




Article 95.  DATE: October 15, 1993, Friday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 5; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 1267 words  
HEADLINE: SOMALIS FREE U.S. PILOT; LAWMAKERS BACK 
CLINTON AIMS;  
AFRICA: PRESIDENT CITES DURANT'S RELEASE AS SIGN HIS 
POLICY IS WORKING. AIDID SURFACES, TELLS REPORTERS IT 
WAS GOODWILL GESTURE. SENATORS AGREE TO ACCEPT 
MARCH 31 PULLOUT DATE.  




Article 96.  DATE: October 16, 1993, Saturday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 4; Column 1; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 1085 words  
HEADLINE: NEWS ANALYSIS;  
SOMALIA SPURS NEW ACTIVISM IN CONGRESS;  
GOVERNMENT: LAWMAKERS IMPOSED THEIR WILL IN A WAY 
THAT COULD HERALD GREATER LEGISLATIVE INVOLVEMENT 
IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS.  
BYLINE: By MICHAEL ROSS and KAREN TUMULTY, TIMES 
STAFF WRITERS  
DATELINE: WASHINGTON 
 
Article 97.  DATE: October 17, 1993, Sunday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 2; National Desk  
LENGTH: 1620 words  
HEADLINE: DEATHS IN SOMALIA SPARK FLOOD OF 
OPPOSITION IN U.S.  
BYLINE: By SARA FRITZ, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: LOWELL, Mass. 
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Article 98.  DATE: October 18, 1993, Monday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 4; Column 5; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 719 words  
HEADLINE: AIDID BACKERS HOLD PEACE RALLY IN SOMALI 
CAPITAL;  
AFRICA: THE DEMONSTRATION BY 1,000 PEOPLE IS PART OF A 
CAMPAIGN TO CHANGE HIS WARLORD IMAGE.  
BYLINE: From Associated Press  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia 
 
Article 99.  DATE: October 19, 1993, Tuesday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 1; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 1259 words  
HEADLINE: MANY IN MILITARY ANGRY OVER CLINTON'S 
POLICIES;  
ARMED FORCES: SENIOR OFFICERS SEE A LACK OF CLEAR U.S. 
GOALS IN SOMALIA, HAITI -- AND A TENDENCY TO CUT AND 
RUN.  




Article 100. DATE: October 21, 1993, Thursday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 5; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 1573 words  
HEADLINE: RANGERS' SOMALIA MISSION MARRED BY LAPSES, 
ERRORS;  
MILITARY: TROOPS' HIGH-PROFILE SEARCH FOR WARLORD 
AIDID WENT AWRY. THAT LED TO CHANGE IN U.S. POLICY.  
BYLINE: By MARK FINEMAN, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia 
 
Article 101. DATE: October 22, 1993, Friday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 16; Column 1; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 641 words  
HEADLINE: AIDID HUNT WAS 'GROSS MISCALCULATION,' U.S. 
GENERAL SAYS;  
SOMALIA: WARLORD'S CLAN WOULD 'FIGHT YOU TO THE 
DEATH,' JOHNSTON TELLS LAWMAKERS. HE ENDORSES 
REVISED AMERICAN POLICY.  




Article 102. DATE: October 25, 1993, Monday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 4; Column 1; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 1160 words  
HEADLINE: SOMALIS FEAR NEW DISASTER AFTER U.S. TROOPS 
PULL OUT;  
AFRICA: MARCH DATE IS TOO EARLY, THEY INSIST. CITIZENS 
BECOMING DESPERATE AS MORE BLOODSHED, FAMINE LOOM.  
BYLINE: By MARK FINEMAN, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia 
 
Article 103. DATE: November 2, 1993, Tuesday, Home Edition  
SECTION: World Report; Page 5; Column 1; World Report  
LENGTH: 736 words  
HEADLINE: AMERICA'S WORLD ROLE: DIVIDED WE STAND;  
THE PUBLIC;  
AMERICANS VIEW TROOP DEPLOYMENTS CAUTIOUSLY;  
* A MAJORITY THINK FAMINE RELIEF WARRANTS 
DISPATCHING SOLDIERS ABROAD. BUT THEY DRAW THE LINE 
AT SUCH TASKS AS RESTORING LAW AND ORDER.  
BYLINE: By Doyle McManus  
DATELINE: WASHINGTON 
 
Article 104. DATE: November 5, 1993, Friday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 4; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 656 words  
HEADLINE: REINFORCED U.S. TROOPS RESUME SOMALIA 
PATROLS  
BYLINE: By RICHARD A. SERRANO, TIMES STAFF WRITER  
DATELINE: WASHINGTON 
 
Article 105. DATE: March 4, 1994, Friday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Part A; Page 16; Column 1; Foreign Desk  
LENGTH: 1058 words  
HEADLINE: SOMALIA CASTS SHADOW ON U.S. FOREIGN 
POLICY;  
AFRICA: ANALYSTS SAY THE MISSION MAY PROVE AN 
EXCEPTION TO THE PATTERN OF U.S. ACTION ABROAD.  




Article 106. DATE: April 1, 1994, Friday, Home Edition  
SECTION: Metro; Part B; Page 7; Column 1; Metro Desk  
LENGTH: 777 words  
HEADLINE: PAYING THE PRICE OF DOING 'GOD'S WORK';  
SOMALIA: UNWILLING TO RISK U.S. LIVES, WE STRETCHED 
THE RULES AND SOMALIS DIED.  
BYLINE: By A. J. BACEVICH, A.J. Bacevich is executive director of the 
Foreign Policy Institute at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced 







































APPENDIX B – OPINION POLLS SELECTED 
All polls were accessed on-line through the Lexis-Nexis Database at http://web.lexis-
nexis.com/universe.  The following list is divided into groups by subject (mission 
approval, mission goals, overall importance, US involvement, pullout conditions, and if 
the mission was worth it) and in ascending order by date within each group. 
 
Poll 1. QUESTION:  
Do you approve or disapprove of President Bush's plan to send 
American military forces to assure distribution relief supplies in 
the African nation of Somalia?  
 
RESULTS:    
Approve                       - 66%  
Disapprove                   - 24  
Don't know/Refused     - 11  
  
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: GALLUP 
ORGANIZATION  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 602  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
SURVEY SPONSOR: Newsweek  
BEGINNING DATE: December 3, 1992  
ENDING DATE: December 4, 1992  





Poll 2. QUESTION:  
Do you approve or disapprove of the decision to send U.S. 
(United States) armed forces into the African nation of Somalia 
as part of a United Nations effort to deliver relief supplies there?  
 
RESULTS:      
Approve         - 74%  
Disapprove     - 21  
No opinion      - 5  
  
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: GALLUP 
ORGANIZATION  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,005  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
BEGINNING DATE: December 4, 1992  
ENDING DATE: December 6, 1992  




Poll 3. QUESTION:  
Do you favor or oppose sending 28,000 American troops to 
Somalia to help distribute food and medicine?   
  
RESULTS:       
Favor                        - 75%  
Oppose                     - 20  
Not sure/Refused      - 5  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: LOUIS 
HARRIS AND ASSOCIATES  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,254  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
BEGINNING DATE: December 4, 1992  
ENDING DATE: December 8, 1992  





Poll 4. QUESTION:  
Do you think the United States should be sending U.S. (United 
States) troops to Somalia to try and make sure shipments of food 
get through to the people there, or should U.S. troops stay out?  
 
RESULTS:      
Should be sending troops     - 72%  
Should stay out                     - 16  
Don't know/No answer         - 12  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 835  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
BEGINNING DATE: December 6, 1992  
ENDING DATE: December 6, 1992  




Poll 5. QUESTION:  
Do you approve or disapprove of the way George Bush has been 
handling the situation in Somalia?  
 
RESULTS:      
Approve                           - 73%  
Disapprove                       - 19  
Don't know/No answer     - 8  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS, 
NEW YORK TIMES  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,333  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
BEGINNING DATE: December 7, 1992  
ENDING DATE: December 9, 1992  





Poll 6. QUESTION:  
Do you think the United States is doing the right thing to send 
U.S. troops to Somalia to try and make sure shipments of food 
get through to the people there, or should U.S. troops have 
stayed out?  
 
RESULTS:      
Right thing                         - 81%  
Should have stayed out     - 14  
Don't know/No answer      - 5  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS, 
NEW YORK TIMES  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,333  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
BEGINNING DATE: December 7, 1992  
ENDING DATE: December 9, 1992  




Poll 7. QUESTION:  
Do you approve or disapprove of (President George) Bush's 
decision to send U.S. (United States) troops to Somalia?  
 
RESULTS:      
Approve                             - 76%  
Disapprove                         - 21  
Don't know/No opinion      - 3  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: ABC NEWS, 
WASHINGTON POST  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,011  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
BEGINNING DATE: December 11, 1992  
ENDING DATE: December 14, 1992  






Poll 8. QUESTION:  
Do you approve or disapprove of (George) Bush's decision to 
send U.S. (United States) troops to Somalia?  
 
RESULTS:     
Approve                            - 80%  
Disapprove                        - 16  
Don't know/No opinion     - 4  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: ABC NEWS  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 513  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
BEGINNING DATE: January 13, 1993  
ENDING DATE: January 13, 1993  




Poll 9. QUESTION:  
Do you think the United States is doing a good job or a poor job 
in trying to help the U.N. (United Nations) solve the problems in 
Somalia?   
 
RESULTS:   
Good               - 77%  
Poor                - 18  
Don't know     - 5  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: MARKET 
STRATEGIES AND GREENBERG RESEARCH  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,020  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
SURVEY SPONSOR: Americans Talk Issues Found. & the W. 
Alton Jones Found.  
BEGINNING DATE: March 23, 1993  
ENDING DATE: April 4, 1993  






Poll 10. QUESTION:  
Last week (June, 1993), the United States participated in a 
military operation with the United Nations against one of the 
warlords in Somalia. Do you generally approve or disapprove of 
that decision?  
 
RESULTS:    
Approve         - 65%  
Disapprove     - 23  
No opinion     - 12  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: GALLUP 
ORGANIZATION  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,003  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
BEGINNING DATE: June 18, 1993  
ENDING DATE: June 21, 1993  




Poll 11. QUESTION:  
Do you approve or disapprove of the way (President) Bill 
Clinton is handling the situation in Somalia?  
 
RESULTS:      
Approve                          - 51%  
Disapprove                      - 21  
Don't know/No answer    - 27  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS, 
NEW YORK TIMES  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,363  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
SURVEY NOTES: 622 respondents were reinterviewed on 
6/27/93 after the missile attack on Baghdad, Iraq (June 26, 
1993). Those results are shown separately.  
BEGINNING DATE: June 21, 1993  
ENDING DATE: June 24, 1993  





Poll 12. QUESTION:  
Do you approve or disapprove of the way (President) Bill 
Clinton is handling the situation in Somalia? (If Depends probe 
once with:) Overall, do you approve or disapprove of the way 
Bill Clinton is handling the situation in Somalia?   
 
RESULTS:   
Approve                       - 41%  
Disapprove                   - 39  
Don't know/Refused     - 19  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: PRINCETON 
SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 2,000  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
SURVEY SPONSOR: Times Mirror  
BEGINNING DATE: September 9, 1993  
ENDING DATE: September 15, 1993  





Poll 13. QUESTION:  
In general, do you approve or disapprove of the presence of U.S. 
(United States) troops in Somalia?  
 
RESULTS:      
Approve         - 43%  
Disapprove     - 46  
Not sure          - 11  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: 
YANKELOVICH PARTNERS INC.  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 800  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
SURVEY SPONSOR: Time, Cable News Network  
BEGINNING DATE: September 23, 1993  
ENDING DATE: September 23, 1993  






Poll 14. QUESTION:  
President (Bill) Clinton has ordered several hundred more 
American troops and some armored vehicles into Somalia to 
deal with the military situation there. Do you approve or 
disapprove of that decision?  
 
RESULTS:      
Approve                        - 38%  
Disapprove                    - 57  
Don't know/Refused     - 5  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: GALLUP 
ORGANIZATION  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 525  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
SURVEY SPONSOR: Cable News Network, U.S.A. Today  
BEGINNING DATE: October 5, 1993  
ENDING DATE: October 5, 1993  




Poll 15. QUESTION:  
Looking back, do you approve or disapprove of (President) 
George Bush's decision to send U.S. (United States) troops to 
Somalia last December (1992)?  
 
RESULTS:      
Approve                             - 56%  
Disapprove                         - 38  
Don't know/No opinion      - 5  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: ABC NEWS  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 509  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
SURVEY NOTES: The interviewing was done after the 
evening news programs aired in each time zone.  
BEGINNING DATE: October 5, 1993  
ENDING DATE: October 5, 1993  





Poll 16. QUESTION:  
Do you approve or disapprove of the way (President) Bill 
Clinton is handling the situation in Somalia?   
 
RESULTS:   
Approve         - 33%  
Disapprove     - 53  
No opinion     - 14  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: ABC NEWS  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 509  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
SURVEY NOTES: The interviewing was done after the 
evening news programs aired in each time zone.  
BEGINNING DATE: October 5, 1993  
ENDING DATE: October 5, 1993  




Poll 17. QUESTION:  
Do you think the United States did the right thing to send U.S. 
(United States) troops to Somalia last December (1992) to try to 
make sure shipments of food got through to the people there, or 
should the U.S. troops have stayed out?  
 
RESULTS:      
Right thing                        - 63%  
Stayed out                        - 33  
Don't know/No answer     - 4  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,117  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
BEGINNING DATE: October 6, 1993  
ENDING DATE: October 7, 1993  





Poll 18. QUESTION:  
Do you approve or disapprove of the way (President) Bill 
Clinton is handling the situation in Somalia?   
   
RESULTS:   
Approve                           - 26%  
Disapprove                       - 56  
Don't know/No answer     - 18  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,117  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
BEGINNING DATE: October 6, 1993  
ENDING DATE: October 7, 1993  




Poll 19. QUESTION:  
Do you think the United States did the right thing to send U.S. 
troops to Somalia last December (1992) to try and make sure 
shipments of food got through to the people there, or should the 
U.S. troops have stayed out?   
   
RESULTS:   
Right thing                        - 64%  
Stayed out                         - 32  
Don't know/No answer     - 4  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 530  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
BEGINNING DATE: October 6, 1993  
ENDING DATE: October 6, 1993  





Poll 20. QUESTION:  
Do you approve or disapprove of the way (President) Bill 
Clinton is handling the situation in Somalia?   
 
RESULTS:   
Approve                           - 21%  
Disapprove                       - 58  
Don't know/No answer     - 21  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 530  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
BEGINNING DATE: October 6, 1993  
ENDING DATE: October 6, 1993  




Poll 21. QUESTION:  
Do you approve or disapprove of (President Bill) Clinton's 
decision to withdraw all U.S. (United States) troops except for 
some support personnel from Somalia by March 31 (1994)?  
 
RESULTS:      
Approve                             - 70%  
Disapprove                         - 27  
Don't know/No opinion      - 3  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: 
WASHINGTON POST  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,015  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
BEGINNING DATE: October 7, 1993  
ENDING DATE: October 10, 1993  





Poll 22. QUESTION:  
Do you approve or disapprove of (President Bill) Clinton's 
decision to send additional military troops to Somalia?  
 
RESULTS:      
Approve                            - 44%  
Disapprove                        - 53  
Don't know/No opinion     - 3  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: 
WASHINGTON POST  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,015  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
BEGINNING DATE: October 7, 1993  
ENDING DATE: October 10, 1993  




Poll 23. QUESTION:  
Do you approve or disapprove of the way (President) Bill 
Clinton is handling the situation in Somalia?   
 
RESULTS:   
Approve         - 36%  
Disapprove     - 52  
No opinion     - 12  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: ABC NEWS  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 506  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
BEGINNING DATE: October 7, 1993  
ENDING DATE: October 7, 1993  





Poll 24. QUESTION:  
Do you approve or disapprove of his (President Bill Clinton's) 
decision to set a March 31 (1994) withdrawal date (for U.S. 
troops in Somalia)?   
   
RESULTS:   
Approve          - 45%  
Disapprove     - 49  
No opinion     - 6  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: ABC NEWS  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 506  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
BEGINNING DATE: October 7, 1993  
ENDING DATE: October 7, 1993  




Poll 25. QUESTION:  
As you may know, President (Bill) Clinton announced he is 
doubling the number of U.S. (United States) troops in Somalia, 
in order to protect American troops already there and complete 
the mission by March 31st (1994). Do you support or oppose 
sending additional troops to Somalia?  
 
RESULTS:      
Support         - 55%  
Oppose          - 42  
No opinion    - 3  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: GALLUP 
ORGANIZATION  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,019  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
BEGINNING DATE: October 8, 1993  
ENDING DATE: October 10, 1993  





Poll 26. QUESTION:  
Do you approve or disapprove of the way he (President Bill 
Clinton) is handling... the situation in Somalia?   
   
RESULTS:   
Approve         - 32%  
Disapprove     - 59  
No opinion     - 9  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: GALLUP 
ORGANIZATION  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,019  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
BEGINNING DATE: October 8, 1993  
ENDING DATE: October 10, 1993  




Poll 27. QUESTION:  
Do you approve or disapprove of the way (President Bill) 
Clinton is handling the situation in Somalia?   
   
RESULTS:   
Approve         - 34%  
Disapprove     - 62  
No opinion     - 4  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: ABC NEWS  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 505  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
SURVEY NOTES: The poll was conducted after the evening 
news programs in every time zone.  
BEGINNING DATE: October 12, 1993  
ENDING DATE: October 12, 1993  





Poll 28. QUESTION:  
Do you think the United States did the right thing to send U.S. 
troops to Somalia last December (1992) to try and make sure 
shipments of food got through to the people there, or should the 
U.S. troops have stayed out?  
 
RESULTS:      
Right thing                        - 67%  
Stayed out                         - 30  
Don't know/No answer     - 3  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 893  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
BEGINNING DATE: October 18, 1993  
ENDING DATE: October 19, 1993  




Poll 29. QUESTION:  
Do you approve or disapprove of the way (President) Bill 
Clinton is handling the situation in Somalia?   
   
RESULTS:   
Approve                            - 29%  
Disapprove                        - 58  
Don't know/No answer      - 13  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 893  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
BEGINNING DATE: October 18, 1993  
ENDING DATE: October 19, 1993  





Poll 30. QUESTION:  
Do you approve or disapprove of the way (President) Bill 
Clinton is handling the situation in Somalia? (If 'Depends' probe 
once with:) Overall, do you approve or disapprove of the way 
Bill Clinton is handling the situation in Somalia?   
   
RESULTS:   
Approve                        - 33%  
Disapprove                    - 54  
Don't know/Refused     - 13  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: PRINCETON 
SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,200  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
SURVEY SPONSOR: Times Mirror  
BEGINNING DATE: October 21, 1993  
ENDING DATE: October 24, 1993  





Poll 31. QUESTION:  
Do you approve or disapprove of the way (President Bill) 
Clinton is handling the situation in Somalia?  
 
RESULTS:      
Approve         - 35%  
Disapprove     - 57  
No opinion     - 8  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: ABC NEWS, 
WASHINGTON POST  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,218  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
BEGINNING DATE: November 11, 1993  
ENDING DATE: November 14, 1993  






Poll 32. QUESTION:  
Do you think the United States did the right thing to send U.S. 
troops to Somalia last December to try and make sure shipments 
of food got through to the people there, or should the U.S. 
troops have stayed out?   
   
RESULTS:   
Did the right thing              - 62%  
Should have stayed out      - 33  
Don't know/No answer       - 5  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,289  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
BEGINNING DATE: December 5, 1993  
ENDING DATE: December 7, 1993  




Poll 33. QUESTION:  
What should be the U.S. (United States) goal in Somalia?  
 
RESULTS:    
Assuring delivery of relief supplies only     - 47%  
Assuring delivery of relief supplies, then  
helping to restore peace and a working  
government                                                   - 46  
Don't know/Refused                                     - 7  
  
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: GALLUP 
ORGANIZATION  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 602  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
SURVEY SPONSOR: Newsweek  
BEGINNING DATE: December 3, 1992  
ENDING DATE: December 4, 1992  




Poll 34. QUESTION:  
Regarding the situation in Somalia, how confident are you that 
each of the following will happen? Are you very confident, 
somewhat confident, not too confident, or not at all confident 
that... the U.S. (United States) will be able to accomplish its 
goals with very few or no American casualties?  
 
RESULTS:    
Very               - 27%  
Somewhat       - 37  
Not too           - 22  
Not at all         - 10  
No opinion      - 4  
  
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: GALLUP 
ORGANIZATION  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,005  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
BEGINNING DATE: December 4, 1992  
ENDING DATE: December 6, 1992  
SOURCE DOCUMENT: GALLUP POLL 
 
Mission goals 
Poll 35. QUESTION:  
Do you think the role of U.S. (United States) troops in Somalia 
should be limited to delivering relief supplies there, or should 
they also attempt to bring a permanent end to the fighting in 
Somalia?  
 
RESULTS:      
Limited role                                    - 59%  
Also attempt to end the fighting     - 31  
Neither (vol.)                                  - 3  
Other (vol.)                                     - 2  
No opinion                                      - 5  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: GALLUP 
ORGANIZATION  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,005  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
BEGINNING DATE: December 4, 1992  
ENDING DATE: December 6, 1992  




Poll 36. QUESTION:  
Do you think U.S. (United States) troops should stay in Somalia 
only as long as it takes to set up supply lines to make sure 
people don't starve, or do you think they should stay there as 
long as it takes to make sure Somalia will remain peaceful?  
 
RESULTS:    
Set up supply lines                                 - 48%  
Make sure Somalia remains peaceful     - 44  
Shouldn't be there (vol.)                          - 3  
Don't know/No answer                            - 5  
  
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS, 
NEW YORK TIMES  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,333  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
BEGINNING DATE: December 7, 1992  
ENDING DATE: December 9, 1992  
SOURCE DOCUMENT: CBS NEWS, NEW YORK TIMES 
 
Mission goals 
Poll 37. QUESTION:  
What's your impression of the principal objective of American 
forces in Somalia? Is it to disarm the gangs of Somali gunmen 
and end the civil war, or is it to restore enough order so that 
famine relief can take place?  
 
RESULTS:      
Disarm gunmen              - 10%  
Restore enough order     - 81  
Not sure                         - 9  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: PRINCETON 
SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,216  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
SURVEY SPONSOR: Times Mirror  
BEGINNING DATE: January 3, 1993  
ENDING DATE: January 6, 1993  





Poll 38. QUESTION:  
Do you think U.S. (United States) troops should stay in Somalia 
only as long as it takes to set up supply lines to make sure 
people don't starve, or do you think they should stay there as 
long as it takes to make sure Somalia will remain peaceful?  
 
RESULTS:    
Till supply lines set up         - 47%  
Till peaceful                          - 48  
Don't know/No answer         - 5  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS, 
NEW YORK TIMES  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,179  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
BEGINNING DATE: January 12, 1993  
ENDING DATE: January 14, 1993  
SOURCE DOCUMENT: CBS NEWS, NEW YORK TIMES 
 
Mission goals 
Poll 39. QUESTION:  
(President Bill) Clinton will have to make decisions about some 
foreign policy issues when he takes office. Which of the 
following comes closest to your own view about the decisions 
he should make?   
 
RESULTS:       
The U.S. (United States) troops in Somalia  
should stay until the groups that are fighting  
there are disarmed                                                      - 51%  
The U.S. should leave Somalia as soon as food  
suppliers are distributed throughout the  
country                                                                       - 44  
Don't know/Refused                                                   - 5  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: PRINCETON 
SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,005  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
SURVEY SPONSOR: U.S. News and World Report  
BEGINNING DATE: January 12, 1993  
ENDING DATE: January 13, 1993  





Poll 40. QUESTION:  
Do you think the U.S. (United States) troops in Somalia should 
be responsible for disarming the rival warlords there, or should 
the U.S. troops only be responsible for making sure that food is 
delivered to areas affected by the famine?  
 
RESULTS:      
Disarming the warlords     - 41%  
Delivering food                  - 52  
Not sure                             - 7  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: 
YANKELOVICH PARTNERS INC.  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,000  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
SURVEY SPONSOR: Time, Cable News Network  
BEGINNING DATE: January 13, 1993  
ENDING DATE: January 14, 1993  




Poll 41. QUESTION:  
(Please tell me if you support or oppose the following policies in 
Yugoslavia, Bosnia, Somalia and Iraq.)... Having U.S. (United 
States) troops disarm the warring factions in Somalia   
 
RESULTS:   
Support      - 71%  
Oppose       - 24  
Not sure     - 5  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: LOUIS 
HARRIS AND ASSOCIATES  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,255  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
BEGINNING DATE: January 22, 1993  
ENDING DATE: January 26, 1993  




Poll 42. QUESTION:  
(Please tell me if you support or oppose the following policies in 
Yugoslavia, Bosnia, Somalia and Iraq.)... Keeping the U.S. 
(United States) troops in Somalia until they can hand over to a 
reasonably stable government   
 
RESULTS:   
Support      - 77%  
Oppose       - 20  
Not sure     - 3  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: LOUIS 
HARRIS AND ASSOCIATES  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,255  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
BEGINNING DATE: January 22, 1993  
ENDING DATE: January 26, 1993  
SOURCE DOCUMENT: HARRIS POLL 
 
Mission goals 
Poll 43. QUESTION:  
Mohammed Farah Aidid is the leader of a Somali clan whose 
troops killed United Nations peacekeepers. U.N. troops are 
trying to capture him. Do you think this is a good idea because it 
shows that violence against U.N. peacekeepers will not be 
tolerated, or do you think this is a bad idea because this gets the 
U.N. involved in Somalia's civil war?  
 
RESULTS:      
Good idea                          - 66%  
Bad idea                            - 23  
Don't know/No answer     - 11  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS, 
NEW YORK TIMES  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,363  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
SURVEY NOTES: 622 respondents were reinterviewed on 
6/27/93 after the missile attack on Baghdad, Iraq (June 26, 
1993). Those results are shown separately.  
BEGINNING DATE: June 21, 1993  
ENDING DATE: June 24, 1993  




Poll 44. QUESTION:  
When United Nations peace-keepers are killed in Somalia, 
should United States troops retaliate, or is that likely to get the 
United States bogged down in Somalia?  
 
RESULTS:      
Should retaliate                       - 41%  
Likely to get bogged down     - 42  
Don't know/No answer           - 17  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS, 
NEW YORK TIMES  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,363  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
SURVEY NOTES: 622 respondents were reinterviewed on 
6/27/93 after the missile attack on Baghdad, Iraq (June 26, 
1993). Those results are shown separately.  
BEGINNING DATE: June 21, 1993  
ENDING DATE: June 24, 1993  
SOURCE DOCUMENT: CBS NEWS, NEW YORK TIMES 
 
Mission goals 
Poll 45. QUESTION:  
Do you think U.S. (United States) troops should leave Somalia 
altogether, or should they stay in a limited capacity to preserve 
peace?  
 
RESULTS:      
Leave altogether                   - 53%  
Stay in a limited capacity     - 46  
Don't know/Refused             - 1  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: GALLUP 
ORGANIZATION  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,002  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
SURVEY SPONSOR: Cable News Network, U.S.A. Today  
QUESTION NOTES: Asked of those who said U.S. should 
stop active military involvement (57%)  
BEGINNING DATE: September 10, 1993  
ENDING DATE: September 12, 1993  




Poll 46. QUESTION:  
Do you think the United States should keep troops in Somalia 
until there's a functioning civil government there that can run 
things, or do you think the U.S. should pull its troops out of 
Somalia very soon, even if there is no functioning civil 
government in place there?  
 
RESULTS:      
Keep troops in Somalia         - 28%  
Pull troops out of Somalia     - 64  
No opinion                             - 8  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: ABC NEWS  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 509  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
SURVEY NOTES: The interviewing was done after the 
evening news programs aired in each time zone.  
BEGINNING DATE: October 5, 1993  
ENDING DATE: October 5, 1993  
SOURCE DOCUMENT: ABC NEWS 
 
Mission goals 
Poll 47. QUESTION:  
Three is now a proposal to immediately send several thousand 
additional U.S. (United States) troops to Somalia, with two 
missions: to try to free the U.S. servicemen now being held 
hostage, and to establish order in Somalia. Would you favor or 
oppose this proposal?   
   
RESULTS:   
Favor          - 61%  
Oppose       - 26  
Not sure     - 13  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: NBC NEWS  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 806  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
BEGINNING DATE: October 6, 1993  
ENDING DATE: October 6, 1993  




Poll 48. QUESTION:  
(Here are a few questions concerning the recent events in 
Somalia, in which U.S. (United States) soldiers have been killed 
or taken prisoner by forces controlled by a Somalian warlord.) 
(In making decisions about Somalia, which of the following 
should be the most important goals of the United States and 
which should not?)... Establishing a stable government in 
Somalia.   
   
RESULTS:   
Should be           - 43%  
Should not be     - 52  
Not sure             - 5  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: 
YANKELOVICH PARTNERS INC.  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 500  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
SURVEY SPONSOR: Time, Cable News Network  
BEGINNING DATE: October 7, 1993  
ENDING DATE: October 7, 1993  





Poll 49. QUESTION:  
(Here are a few questions concerning the recent events in 
Somalia, in which U.S. (United States) soldiers have been killed 
or taken prisoner by forces controlled by a Somalian warlord.) 
(In making decisions about Somalia, which of the following 
should be the most important goals of the United States and 
which should not?)... Ending starvation in Somalia.   
   
RESULTS:   
Should be           - 61%  
Should not be     - 33  
Not sure             - 6  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: 
YANKELOVICH PARTNERS INC.  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 500  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
SURVEY SPONSOR: Time, Cable News Network  
BEGINNING DATE: October 7, 1993  
ENDING DATE: October 7, 1993  





Poll 50. QUESTION:  
(Here are a few questions concerning the recent events in 
Somalia, in which U.S. (United States) soldiers have been killed 
or taken prisoner by forces controlled by a Somalian warlord.) 
(In making decisions about Somalia, which of the following 
should be the most important goals of the United States and 
which should not?)... Capturing the Somali warlord responsible 
for the attack on the U.S. troops.   
   
RESULTS:   
Should be           - 63%  
Should not be     - 32  
Not sure             - 5  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: 
YANKELOVICH PARTNERS INC.  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 500  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
SURVEY SPONSOR: Time, Cable News Network  
BEGINNING DATE: October 7, 1993  
ENDING DATE: October 7, 1993  





Poll 51. QUESTION:  
(Here are a few questions concerning the recent events in 
Somalia, in which U.S. (United States) soldiers have been killed 
or taken prisoner by forces controlled by a Somalian warlord.) 
(In making decisions about Somalia, which of the following 
should be the most important goals of the United States and 
which should not?)... Bringing U.S. troops home as soon as 
possible.   
   
RESULTS:   
Should be           - 89%  
Should not be     - 10  
Not sure             - 1  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: 
YANKELOVICH PARTNERS INC.  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 500  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
SURVEY SPONSOR: Time, Cable News Network  
BEGINNING DATE: October 7, 1993  
ENDING DATE: October 7, 1993  





Poll 52. QUESTION:  
(Here are a few questions concerning the recent events in 
Somalia, in which U.S. (United States) soldiers have been killed 
or taken prisoner by forces controlled by a Somalian warlord.) 
In making decisions about Somalia, which of the following 
should be the most important goals of the United States and 
which should not?... Making sure that the U.S. soldiers taken 
prisoner in Somalia are safely released.   
   
RESULTS:   
Should be           - 96%  
Should not be     - 3  
Not sure             - 1  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: 
YANKELOVICH PARTNERS INC.  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 500  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
SURVEY SPONSOR: Time, Cable News Network  
BEGINNING DATE: October 7, 1993  
ENDING DATE: October 7, 1993  





Poll 53. QUESTION:  
What if removing U.S. (United States) troops from Somalia 
could lead to a breakdown in food distribution and another 
famine there--should the U.S. troops be pulled out, or not?   
   
RESULTS: 
Yes                 - 79%  
No                  - 16  
No opinion     -  6  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: ABC NEWS  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 509  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
QUESTION NOTES: Asked of those who said U.S. troops 
should be removed very soon even if there is no functioning 
civil government (64%)  
SURVEY NOTES: The interviewing was done after the 
evening news programs aired in each time zone.  
BEGINNING DATE: October 5, 1993  
ENDING DATE: October 5, 1993  





Poll 54. QUESTION:  
How soon do you think U.S. (United States) troops should be 
removed from Somalia--immediately, before the end of the year, 
or what?   
   
RESULTS:   
Immediately                                        - 58%  
Before the end of the year                   - 38  
Longer than year's end (into 1994)     - 2  
No opinion                                          - 2  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: ABC NEWS  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 509  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
QUESTION NOTES: Asked of those who said U.S. troops 
should be removed very soon even if there is no functioning 
civil government (64%)  
SURVEY NOTES: The interviewing was done after the 
evening news programs aired in each time zone.  
BEGINNING DATE: October 5, 1993  
ENDING DATE: October 5, 1993  




Poll 55. QUESTION:  
What should the United States do now? Do you think the United 
States should keep its troops in Somalia until the situation in 
Somalia is peaceful, or should the United States withdraw its 
troops quickly?  
 
RESULTS:      
Keep its troops in Somalia     - 32%  
Withdraw                               - 60  
Don't know/No answer          - 9  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,117  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
BEGINNING DATE: October 6, 1993  
ENDING DATE: October 7, 1993  





Poll 56. QUESTION:  
One of the objectives of the mission has been to capture the 
Somali clan leader Mahammed Farah Aideed. What do you 
think is more important--to capture Mahammed Farah Aideed 
before withdrawing U.S. (United States) troops from Somalia, 
or withdrawing U.S. troops from Somalia as soon as possible, 
even if Aideed is not captured?   
   
RESULTS:   
Capture Aideed before withdrawing     - 34%  
Withdraw regardless                             - 56  
Don't know/No answer                         - 11  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,117  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
BEGINNING DATE: October 6, 1993  
ENDING DATE: October 7, 1993  




Poll 57. QUESTION:  
Do you favor or oppose the United States withdrawing all of its 
troops from Somalia?   
   
RESULTS:   
Favor          - 64%  
Oppose       - 29  
Not sure      - 7  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: NBC NEWS  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 806  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
BEGINNING DATE: October 6, 1993  
ENDING DATE: October 6, 1993  





Poll 58. QUESTION:  
Which of these three options do you most favor for U.S. (United 
States) policy in Somalia--withdraw all U.S. troops 
immediately: withdraw troops, but only after all captured U.S. 
servicemen are returned: or stay in Somalia until political 
stability is restored?   
   
RESULTS:   
Withdraw all troops                                         - 11%  
Withdraw troops after servicemen returned     - 67  
Remain until stability is restored                      - 19  
Not sure                                                            - 3  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: NBC NEWS  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 806  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
BEGINNING DATE: October 6, 1993  
ENDING DATE: October 6, 1993  




Poll 59. QUESTION:  
What do you think is more important--to make sure that all 
Americans captured by the Somalis are safely accounted for 
before withdrawing U.S. (United States) troops from Somalia, 
or withdrawing U.S. troops from Somalia as soon as possible, 
even if not all captured Americans are safely accounted for:   
 
RESULTS:   
Safely accounted for before withdrawing     - 74%  
Withdraw regardless                                      - 19  
Don't know/No answer                                  - 7  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 530  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
BEGINNING DATE: October 6, 1993  
ENDING DATE: October 6, 1993  





Poll 60. QUESTION:  
What do you think is more important--to make sure that all 
Americans captured by the Somalis are safely accounted for 
before withdrawing U.S. (United States) troops from Somalia, 
or withdrawing U.S. troops from Somalia as soon as possible, 
even if not all captured Americans are safely accounted for?   
   
RESULTS:   
Safely accounted for before withdrawing     - 73%  
Withdraw regardless                                     - 20  
Don't know/No answer                                 - 7  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,117  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
BEGINNING DATE: October 6, 1993  
ENDING DATE: October 7, 1993  




Poll 61. QUESTION:  
What would be your preference--to have all U.S. (United States) 
troops withdrawn from Somalia immediately, by March 31, 
(1994), or sometime after March 31?   
   
RESULTS:   
Immediately                           - 50%  
March 31                                - 33  
Some time after March 31      - 9  
Not at all (vol.)                       - 3  
No opinion                              - 5  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: ABC NEWS  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 506  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
BEGINNING DATE: October 7, 1993  
ENDING DATE: October 7, 1993  





Poll 62. QUESTION:  
If at the time of the withdrawal date there's a risk that 
withdrawing U.S. (United States) troops could lead to a 
breakdown in food distribution and another famine in Somalia, 
should the United States withdraw its troops anyway, or not?   
   
RESULTS:   
Yes, should withdraw          - 64%  
No, should not withdraw     - 32  
No opinion                           - 4  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: ABC NEWS  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 506  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
BEGINNING DATE: October 7, 1993  
ENDING DATE: October 7, 1993  




Poll 63. QUESTION:  
If at the time of the withdrawal date there is still no stable 
government in place to run things in Somalia, should the United 
States withdraw its troops anyway, or not?   
   
RESULTS:   
Yes, should withdraw troops          - 77%  
No, should not withdraw troops     - 20  
No opinion                                      - 3  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: ABC NEWS  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 506  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
BEGINNING DATE: October 7, 1993  
ENDING DATE: October 7, 1993  





Poll 64. QUESTION:  
In your view, what should the United States do now in Somalia-
-One: Withdraw all U.S. troops now, Two: Withdraw U.S. 
troops over the next six months, or Three: Keep troops in 
Somalia until our humanitarian mission has been accomplished?  
 
RESULTS:      
Withdraw now                    - 37%  
Withdraw in six months     - 27  
Keep troops in Somalia      - 31  
No opinion                          - 5  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: GALLUP 
ORGANIZATION  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,019  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
BEGINNING DATE: October 8, 1993  
ENDING DATE: October 10, 1993  




Poll 65. QUESTION:  
In your view, should the U.S. (United States) keep its troops in 
Somalia as long as it takes until:... all American prisoners have 
been recovered?  
 
RESULTS:      
Keep troops     - 76%  
Don't keep       - 20  
No opinion      - 4  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: GALLUP 
ORGANIZATION  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,019  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
BEGINNING DATE: October 8, 1993  
ENDING DATE: October 10, 1993  





Poll 66. QUESTION:  
In your view, should the U.S. (United States) keep its troops in 
Somalia as long as it takes until:... the Somalia warlord, 
Mohammed Farah Aidid, is captured and punished?  
 
RESULTS:      
Keep troops     - 33%  
Don't keep       - 60  
No opinion      - 7  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: GALLUP 
ORGANIZATION  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,019  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
BEGINNING DATE: October 8, 1993  
ENDING DATE: October 10, 1993  




Poll 67. QUESTION:  
In your view, should the U.S. (United States) keep its troops in 
Somalia as long as it takes until:... order has been restored in 
Somalia?  
 
RESULTS:      
Keep troops     - 32%  
Don't keep       - 64  
No opinion      - 4  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: GALLUP 
ORGANIZATION  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,019  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
BEGINNING DATE: October 8, 1993  
ENDING DATE: October 10, 1993  





Poll 68. QUESTION:  
Overall now, please tell me which of the following positions is 
the closest to your position about what the U.S. (United States) 
should do in Somalia?..Withdraw immediately, withdraw in 6 
months, withdraw when we have stabilized the country, even if 
this takes longer than six months.   
   
RESULTS:   
Withdraw immediately                                             - 28%  
Withdraw in 6 months                                              - 43  
Withdraw when we have stabilized the country,  
even if this takes longer than six months                 - 27  
Don't know/Refused                                                 - 2  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: PROGRAM 
ON INTERNATIONAL POLICY ATTITUDES U.  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 803  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
SURVEY NOTES: Interviewing was conducted by National 
Research Inc.  
BEGINNING DATE: October 15, 1993  
ENDING DATE: October 18, 1993  




Poll 69. QUESTION:  
What should the United States do now? Do you think the United 
States should keep its troops in Somalia until the situation in 
Somalia is peaceful, or should the United States withdraw its 
troops as quickly as possible?  
 
RESULTS:      
Keep its troops in Somalia     - 33%  
Withdraw                               - 60  
Don't know/No answer          - 7  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 893  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
BEGINNING DATE: October 18, 1993  
ENDING DATE: October 19, 1993  





Poll 70. QUESTION:  
Given the possible loss of American lives and the other costs 
involved, do you think sending U.S. (United States) troops to 
make sure food gets to the people of Somalia is worth the cost, 
or not?  
 
RESULTS:      
Worth the cost                  - 66%  
Not worth the cost            - 20  
Don't know/No answer     - 14  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 835  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
BEGINNING DATE: December 6, 1992  
ENDING DATE: December 6, 1992  
SOURCE DOCUMENT: CBS NEWS 
 
Worth it 
Poll 71. QUESTION:  
Given the possible loss of American lives, the financial costs, 
and other risks involved, do you think sending U.S. (United 
States) troops to make sure food gets through to the people of 
Somalia is worth the cost, or not?  
 
RESULTS:      
Worth it                            - 70%  
Not worth it                      - 21  
Don't know/No answer     - 9  
  
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS, 
NEW YORK TIMES  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,333  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
BEGINNING DATE: December 7, 1992  
ENDING DATE: December 9, 1992  




Poll 72. QUESTION:  
Given the possible loss of American lives and other costs 
involved, do you think sending U.S. (United States) troops to 
make sure food gets through to the people of Somalia is worth 
the cost, or not?  
 
RESULTS:      
Worth it                            - 69%  
Not worth it                      - 26  
Don't know/No answer     - 5  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS, 
NEW YORK TIMES  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,179  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
BEGINNING DATE: January 12, 1993  
ENDING DATE: January 14, 1993  
SOURCE DOCUMENT: CBS NEWS, NEW YORK TIMES 
 
Worth it 
Poll 73. QUESTION:  
Given the loss of American life, the financial costs, and other 
risks involved, do you think sending U.S. (United States) troops 
to Somalia to make sure food got through to the people of 
Somalia was worth the cost, or not?  
 
RESULTS:      
Worth the cost                  - 45%  
Not worth the cost            - 45  
Don't know/No answer     - 10  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,117  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
BEGINNING DATE: October 6, 1993  
ENDING DATE: October 7, 1993  




Poll 74. QUESTION:  
(Here are a few questions concerning the recent events in 
Somalia, in which U.S. (United States) soldiers have been killed 
or taken prisoner by forces controlled by a Somalian warlord.) 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statements:... 
Nothing the U.S. could accomplish in Somalia is worth the 
death of even one more U.S. soldier.   
   
RESULTS:   
Agree          - 60%  
Disagree     - 35  
Not sure     - 5  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: 
YANKELOVICH PARTNERS INC.  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 500  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
SURVEY SPONSOR: Time, Cable News Network  
BEGINNING DATE: October 7, 1993  
ENDING DATE: October 7, 1993  




Poll 75. QUESTION:  
Given the loss of American life, the financial costs, and other 
risks involved, do you think sending U.S. (United States) troops 
to Somalia to make sure food got through to the people of 
Somalia was worth the cost, or not?  
 
RESULTS:      
Worth the cost                  - 42%  
Not worth the cost            - 44  
Don't know/No answer     - 14  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 893  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
BEGINNING DATE: October 18, 1993  
ENDING DATE: October 19, 1993  




Poll 76. QUESTION:  
Given the loss of American life, the financial costs, and other 
risks involved, do you think sending U.S. (United States) troops 
to Somalia to make sure food got through to the people of 
Somalia was worth the cost, or not?   
   
RESULTS:   
Worth the cost                  - 48%  
Not worth the cost            - 44  
Don't know/No answer     - 8  
 
ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS  
POPULATION: National adult  
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,289  
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone  
BEGINNING DATE: December 5, 1993  
ENDING DATE: December 7, 1993  
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